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IS  There  a 
Corporate  Debt  Crisis? 
CONCERN  about the financial  stability  of the U.S. corporate  sector has 
been a staple of the business press and, to a lesser extent, of academic 
research  for years. Henry Kaufman  has been particularly  consistent in 
warning about the dangers of excessive debt, in the household and 
government  sectors as well as in corporations.  His most recent article 
stresses the rapid  growth  of debt relative  to income, as well as deterio- 
rating  credit  quality.  1 
Table 1  presents  statistics  on U.S. corporate  debt  growth  and  national 
income since 1969.  The first  two columns  give the average  growth  rates 
of nominal  GNP  and  the  book  value  of outstanding  nonfinancial  corporate 
debt, as reported  by the Flow of Funds, for the period 1969-80  and for 
each year in the eighties; Kaufman  cites similar  figures, although  with 
different  sample  periods.  The  final  four  columns  include,  for  comparison, 
related  series from  a sample  of 643 COMPUSTAT  firms. 
The table suggests that if there is any problem  with the rate of debt 
growth, it has developed recently.2 While debt growth and income 
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1. Henry Kaufman, "Debt: The Threat to Economic and Financial  Stability," in 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Kansas  City,  Debt,  Financial  Stability,  and  Public  Policy 
(FRBKC, 1986),  pp. 15-26. For a popular  article  with a similar  emphasis,  see Lindley  H. 
Clark,  Jr., and Alfred  L. Malabre,  Jr., "Borrowing  Binge: Takeover  Trend  Helps Push 
Corporate  Debt and  Defaults  Upward,"  Wall  Street  Journal,  March  15, 1988. 
2. Our  sample  covers only the past two decades. In a broader  historical  perspective, 
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Table 1.  Growth Rates of U.S.  Nonfinancial Corporate Debt 
and Related Series,  1969-86 
Percent  per year 
Fixed  sample  of COMPUSTATfirins 
Book- 
Nominal  Corporate  Gross  value 
Year  GNP  debt  Sales  incomea  debt  Interest 
1969-80  9.5  9.4  13.2  12.8  8.4  14.4 
1981  11.1  10.3  8.6  3.9  11.3  23.2 
1982  3.7  7.2  -2.3  -  15.9  8.3  7.7 
1983  7.3  5.1  1.9  9.7  -  2.0  -4.6 
1984  10.2  15.7  8.2  17.5  9.9  9.2 
1985  6.1  12.0  2.0  -  13.6  12.2  5.7 
1986  5.5  11.9  -  3.0  -  6.8  9.9  6.4 
Sources:  All figures are annual percent changes,  calculated  as differences  in natural logarithms.  Nominal GNP is 
from the National  Income  and Product Accounts.  Corporate debt is total credit market instruments (book value) of 
nonfinancial corporations  from Board of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System,  "Balance  Sheets  for the  U.S. 
Economy,  1946-85"  (Federal  Reserve  Board Release  C.9,  1986) and  "Flow  of Funds  Accounts,"  various  issues. 
Sales,  gross  income,  book  debt,  and  interest  are  from  the  COMPUSTAT  Industrial  and  Research  data  files. 
COMPUSTAT  series  are calculated  for the fixed sample of 643 firms that have all data available for 1969-86; dollar 
values  are summed across  firms, and growth rates are then calculated  for the total. 
a.  After-tax operating income  plus income  taxes  and interest paid. 
growth  were similar  during  the 1970s,  in 1984-86  nonfinancial  corporate 
debt outgrew nominal  GNP by about 18 percentage  points. Sales and 
income growth  were much  more  erratic  in the sample  of COMPUSTAT 
firms,  but  the same  point  is there:  after  growing  more  slowly than  income 
during  1969-80,  debt  and  debt service expanded  much  more  quickly  than 
income and sales in the eighties, notably  during  1981-82  and 1985-86.3 
A point  made  by Kaufman  and  particularly  emphasized  by Benjamin 
Friedman  is that  the increase  in corporate  debt  during  the 1980s  has been 
related to financial  reorganization  and takeover activity.4  The shifts in 
corporate debt during the 1970s and 1980s has been higher than it was during the 1950s and 
1960s, but comparable to debt levels  in earlier periods such as the 1920s. See Robert A. 
Taggart, Jr., "Secular Patterns in the Financing of U.S.  Corporations,"  in Benjamin M. 
Friedman, ed.,  Corporate Capital Strulctlures  in the Untited  States  (University  of Chicago 
Press,  1985), pp. 13-75. 
3.  The negative growth rates of sales in 1986 and gross income in 1985 and 1986 appear 
to  be  due in part to  the presence  of oil companies  in the  sample.  When we  eliminate 
petroleum and natural gas (SIC industry 13) and petroleum refining (SIC industry 29) from 
the sample, the growth rates of sales and gross income become  positive in 1986, although 
the growth rate for gross income remains negative in 1985. Below we present some results 
for the sample excluding the two oil-related industries. 
4.  Benjamin M.  Friedman,  "Increasing  Indebtedness  and Financial  Stability in the 
United States,"  in Federal Reserve  Bank of Kansas City, Debt,  Financial  Stability,  and 
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aggregate  financial  structure  do appear  to have been large  recently. To 
quote Kaufman: "Over the two years 1984 and 1985, the debt of 
nonfinancial  corporations  rose by $384  billion, while equity contracted 
by $99  billion.  This contraction  comprises  the total of retained  earnings, 
which were a positive $53 billion, and net new equity issuance, which 
was a negative $152 billion."5 Kaufman  has characterized  this wide- 
spread substitution of  debt for equity as  an  "audacious levering 
strategy.  " 
The pattern  of substituting  debt for equity is apparent  in the sample 
of 643 COMPUSTAT  firms  introduced  in table 1 as well. Table 2 gives 
the sources and uses of funds for these firms annually for 1969-86. 
Sources are defined as after-tax  earnings  and net debt issue. Uses are 
net equity  repurchases,  dividends,  and "other." The "other" category, 
which should reflect financial  and real investments made by firms, is 
calculated  as a residual. 
The most striking  feature  of the table  is the recent  break  in the pattern 
of equity repurchases.  Until 1984  the firms  in the sample issued small 
net amounts of  equity each year. During 1984-86, however, they 
repurchased  large quantities of equity. These repurchases appear to 
have been financed  in part  by new debt issue and  in part  by reduced  real 
and  financial  investment  by corporations.6 
These  aggregate  numbers  suggest  that  the rise  of corporate  debt  during 
the 1980s  may have been unusual. But the statistics are not definitive. 
First, these debt series are based on book-value measures, not on 
economically  more significant  market  values. Second, debt outstanding 
can be judged high or low only relative to the assets that support it. 
Finally, aggregate  debt measures tell nothing  about the distribution  of 
debt burdens  across firms. Yet for anyone who is concerned about the 
implications  of an aggregate shock for bankruptcy  rates or financial 
distress, the debt burdens  of firms  in the upper  "tail" of the distribution 
are more  important  than  average  measures. 
The primary  purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically  the 
5.  Kaufman,  "Debt:  The Threat  to Economic  and Financial  Stability,"  p. 18. 
6. In  this  discussion  we have  followed  Kaufman  and  others  in  emphasizing  repurchases 
over dividends.  When  debt-asset  ratios  are  calculated  at book values, repurchases  reduce 
outstanding  equity while dividends do not. In corporate financial  theory, however, 
repurchases  and dividends are thought of symmetrically  as cash payments made by 
corporations  to shareholders.  Repurchases  may have tax advantages,  but otherwise  do 
not differ from dividends. In particular,  they do not lower the market  value of equity 
beyond  the usual  drop  when  a dividend  payment  is made. 86  Brookings  Paper-s  otn Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 2.  Sources and Uses of Funds, Fixed Sample of Firms,  1969-86 
Billions  of current dollars 
Sources  Uses 
After-tax  Net  debt  Net  equiity  Total 
Year  earnings  issue  r  epurchase  dividends  Otlera 
1969  16.6  14.8  0.0  8.6  22.8 
1970  15.7  12.9  0.0  8.9  19.7 
1971  17.2  5.8  -  2.1  9.1  16.0 
1972  20.2  5.9  -  1.3  9.4  18.0 
1973  26.8  11.9  -0.5  10.2  29.0 
1974  32.4  22.1  -0.8  11.6  43.7 
1975  28.8  5.4  -  1.6  12.3  23.5 
1976  36.0  6.4  -  2.9  13.7  31.6 
1977  40.0  11.9  -  2.0  15.9  38.0 
1978  44.3  20.3  -2.1  18.1  48.6 
1979  58.1  24.1  -  2.9  20.8  64.3 
1980  61.0  28.1  -  2.7  24.0  67.8 
1981  63.4  30.5  -  6.9  26.7  74.1 
1982  47.6  24.6  -  5.7  28.0  49.9 
1983  55.6  -6.0  -  11.5  29.8  31.3 
1984  69.9  31.7  8.9  31.9  60.8 
1985  52.9  43.6  19.6  32.9  44.0 
1986  48.8  39.6  7.3  38.1  43.0 
Source:  COMPUSTAT  data base.  Tabulations  are for the fixed  sample  of  643 firms that have  all data available 
for 1969-86. 
a.  Calculated as a residual. 
behavior  of nonfinancial  corporate  debt in the United States, especially 
during  recent  years. We use COMPUSTAT  files, which  contain  detailed 
historical  data on the balance sheets and income statements of about 
2,400 nonfinancial  corporations. Of these firms, nearly 1,400 have 
sufficient  data  for us to estimate  market  values of firm  debt  in each year. 
We compare market  values of debt and assets, both in aggregate  and 
cross-sectionally, to address the question of how the upper tail of the 
debt-asset  distribution  has  evolved over  time.  Other  measures  of liquidity 
and indicators  of solvency, such as thie  ratio of interest obligations  to 
income, are examined  in a similar  way. 
Because the COMPUSTAT  data  also allow  a breakdown  of the results 
by two-digit industry  groups, we are able to investigate the degree to 
which aggregate  increases in debt are related to changes in industry 
composition,  and  the extent to which changes  in debt levels are concen- 
trated  in a few industries  or more  diffused.  Using a panel  data  set of two- Ben S. Bernanke and John  Y. Campbell  87 
digit Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC) code industries  over the 
1969-86  period,  we also estimate  an  equation  to capture  the determinants 
of changing  debt-asset  ratios. 
A particular  concern is how a major  economic shock would affect 
firms  with increased  debt burdens. We try to assess whether  the stock 
market  crash  of October  1987  had  different  effects on high-debt  and  low- 
debt firms. Using simulations,  we also study the hypothetical  question 
of how recessions such as those of 1973-74  and 1981-82  would  affect  the 
financial  structures  of ouI sample  of firms  if they took place today. 
Before  beginning  our  empirical  analysis, we address  the issue of why 
high levels of corporate debt should be  of interest to economists, 
forecasters, and policymakers. Although applied economists seem to 
believe that the dangers of debt are obvious, the existing theoretical 
literature  offers  few explanations. 
Our  next section briefly  discusses this issue. We comment  first  on the 
"debt-existence  puzzle  -the  question of why in the first place firms 
choose to use debt as a means  of finance.  The question  is abstract,  but it 
sheds light on the benefits and costs of debt issuance to the individual 
firm,  which we discuss next. We then speculate, based on recent  formal 
research,  on the macroeconomic  significance  of the level of firm  debt. 
The conclusions of our paper are as follows. From a theoretical 
perspective,  there are reasons to believe that debt levels are not irrele- 
vant, in the Modigliani-Miller  sense that firm and economywide per- 
formance  is independent  of financial  structure;  rather,  debt  levels should 
be of concern to policymakers  and others.7  However, the theoretical 
case is far  from  complete  and awaits  further  development.  Empirically, 
the results are mixed. If one believes that the large increases in eq-uity 
values during  the 1980s  reflect good estimates of the present value of 
future  corporate  earnings,  there  appears  to be little  basis for concern. In 
this view, the postwar  "debt crisis," if there  was one, occurred  in 1974. 
However, measures  of corporate  debt burden  on a current  basis, such 
as the ratio  of interest  payments  to cash  flows, have deteriorated  sharply, 
suggesting  possible liquidity  problems  for the corporate  sector. A sharp 
fall in equity  values or some other  adverse shock could  imply  a solvency 
problem  as well. Because policymakers  and economic analysts should 
7.  See Franco Modigliani  and Merton Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance,  and  the  Theory  of Investment,  " American  Economic  Review,  vol. 48  (June  1958), 
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be concerned with worst-case as well as "average" outcomes, our 
findings  in this regard  are worrisome. 
Why Do We Care about Debt? 
The  recent  literature  on the possibility  of an  impending  corporate  debt 
crisis seems to take it for granted  that the aggregate  level of debt has 
macroeconomic  significance-in particular,  that high levels of debt are 
dangerous. But why this might be so is not at all an easy question to 
answer.  At the most basic level, it is not even obvious why debt, defined 
as a claim whose payoff depends on the value of the firm only in the 
worst circumstances  and which is otherwise fixed, exists at all. One 
could imagine many other arrangements  by which firms might obtain 
funds. In an Arrow-Debreu  economy, for example, financing  would be 
done by the sale of fully contingent  claims. (Bankruptcy,  in the sense of 
someone not being able to make a promised  payoff, cannot occur in an 
Arrow-Debreu  world.)  Since it helps  provide  some insight  into why high 
debt  levels may create  real  costs for firms,  we begin  with a discussion  of 
the "existence" question.8  We then consider both the microeconomic 
and  the macroeconomic  consequences of high  levels of firm  debt. 
WHY  FIRMS  ISSUE  DEBT 
One  explanation  for the existence of debt  is debt's tax-favored  status. 
The tax deductibility  of most interest payments in the United States 
creates  more  debt  than  there  otherwise  would  be. However, the tax laws 
do not explain why debt exists in the first place. Many forms of debt 
were common before the adoption of the income tax. Debt is also 
common in countries without interest deductibility,  and the forms of 
debt that  lost deductibility  in the recent U.S. tax reform  are not likely to 
disappear,  although  their use will be reduced. We therefore  put taxes 
aside and  look for more  fundamental  explanations. 
Three  reasons  for  the use of debt  in corporate  finance  are  the costliness 
8. This question  is not usually  addressed  in the large  finance  literature  on the capital 
structure  puzzle.  That  literature  studies  the  determination  of the  firm's  optimal  combination 
of debt  and  equity,  given  that  these are  the only types of borrowing  instruments  available; 
it does not usually  ask  whether  alternative  forms  of financial  contracts  might  not dominate 
both  debt  and  equity.  For  one exception,  see Milton  Harris  and  Artur  Raviv, "The  Design 
of Securities"  (University  of Chicago  and  Northwestern  University,  March  1988). Ben S. Bernanhke  and John  Y. Campbell  89 
of making  claims  contingent  upon  firms'  condition,  the incentive effects 
of debt, and  the use of debt as a risk-sharing  instrument.  All follow from 
failures of the Arrow-Debreu  assumptions  that information  is perfect 
and markets  are complete, and each will be significant  in understanding 
the possible dangers  of a corporate  debt crisis. 
If it is excessively costly or impossible  to distinguish  the condition  of 
firms,  especially in a legally verifiable  way, noncontingent  claims such 
as debt will be attractive. People do in fact seem reluctant  to include 
contingencies  on even easily verifiable  outcomes in contracts. Witness 
the slowness with  which simple  inflation  indexing  has been incorporated 
into labor contracts and financial  arrangements.  An important  point, 
however, is that firms  are virtually  never able to make their debt fully 
noncontingent,  at least not at customary  levels of debt issuance. Con- 
ditions  can  become so unfavorable  that  the  firm  cannot  make  its promised 
payments.  If these "bankruptcy"  conditions  occur, there  must  be some 
mechanism  to verify them  to the lender;  otherwise, the firm  would have 
an incentive  always to claim  bad  luck and  avoid  paying  off. Various  such 
mechanisms exist. One possibility is some sort of auditing  process.9 
Another is some action by the firm to signal unfavorable  conditions, 
such as shutting down operations, that it would not ordinarily  find 
worthwhile to undertake, even if it could reduce debt obligations.10 
Whatever  the mechanism,  it must of necessity involve net social costs 
when it is invoked; if the verification  of the firm's  condition  were free, 
then a debt contract  would not have been desirable  in the first  place. 
A benefit of debt contracts, then, is that they save on the costs of 
ascertaining  a firm's condition when it is relatively good. But when 
conditions  are bad, debt contracts must entail real social costs. Those 
costs may be called bankruptcy  costs, but they should  be thought  of as 
covering a wider range of costs than the usual definition  of the term. 
Importantly,  expected bankruptcy  costs in this sense are higher the 
higher  the expected rate of return  demanded  by the lender, because the 
high expected return increases the circumstances in which the firm 
9. Robert  M. Townsend, "Optimal  Contracts  and Competitive  Markets  with Costly 
State Verification,"  Jourenal  of Economic  Theory, vol. 21 (October 1979),  pp. 265-93; 
Douglas Gale and Martin  Hellwig, "Incentive-Compatible  Debt Contracts:  The One- 
Period  Problem,"  Review of Economic  Stuldies,  vol. 52 (October  1985), pp. 647-64. 
10. Sanford  J. Grossman  and  Oliver  D. Hart,  "Implicit  Contracts,  Moral  Hazard,  and 
Unemployment,"  American Economic  Review,  vol. 71 (May 1981,  Papers and Proceed- 
ings,  1980), pp. 301-07; Roger E. A. Farmer,  "A New Theory of Aggregate  Supply," 
American Economlic  Review, vol. 74 (December  1984).  pp. 920-30. 90  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
cannot  pay off. They are also higher  the lower the initial  net worth  of the 
firm, because low net worth allows the firm to pay off under fewer 
circumstances. 
The second reason  for debt, which also arises because of a departure 
from perfect information,  is debt's possibly desirable  incentive effects 
oni  the owners or managers  of the firm.  11  In the simplest  case, the owner 
and manager  are the same  person  and  are approximately  risk-neutral.  If 
the owner's decisions or level of effort is not fully observable by his 
suppliers  of funds, the optimal  form of lending  involves fixed (noncon- 
tingent)  repayment,  which  forces  the owner  to bear  the  full  consequences 
of his actions and  thus induces  him to make  socially optimal  decisions. 
Strictly speaking, this "first-best" outcome occurs only when the 
firm-owner  has sufficient  financial  capital  to be able to guarantee  repay- 
ment in every contingency and there is no possibility of bankruptcy; 
otherwise, as David Sappington  has shown, the optimal  contract may 
involve a degree  of contingency  and  will not induce  the borrower  to take 
first-best  actions. For our purposes, though, the simple  principal-agent 
model  suggests  two conclusions.  First,  with  low bankruptcy  probabilities 
and low borrower  risk aversion, debt contracts have good incentive 
properties; they induce the owners of the firm to bear most of the 
consequences of their decisions, and therefore to make better deci- 
sions.  12  Second, as above, lower initial  net worth  makes  a good incentive 
structure  harder  to obtain  by reducing  the range  of circumstances  over 
which the firm  can offer Durelv  noncontingent  debt contracts.13 
11. The seminal  piece in this area is Michael  C. Jensen and William  H. Meckling, 
"Theory  of the Firm:  Managerial  Behavior,  Agency  Costs  and  Capital  Structure,  " Journal 
of Financial  Economics,  vol. 3 (October  1976),  pp. 305-60. The points  of this paragraph 
are formalized  in David  Sappington,  "Limited  Liability  Contracts  between  Principal  and 
Agent,"  Journal of Economic  Theory, vol. 29 (February  1983),  pp. 1-21. 
12. If the owners of the firm  difter  from the managers,  then at least the use of debt 
contracts  provides  a stronger  incentive  to the owners to monitor  the managers  properly. 
Michael  C. Jensen, "Takeovers:  Their  Causes  and  Consequences,"  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives,  vol. 2 (Winter  1988),  pp. 21-48, argues  that  debt  reduces  the principal-agent 
problem  between  owners  and  managers  because it commits  the managers  to pay out free 
cash  flow  that  they might  otherwise  misuse.  For  an early,  formal  statement  of the  free cash 
flow  theory,  see Sanford  J. Grossman  and  Oliver  D. Hart,  "Corporate  Financial  Structure 
and Managerial  Incentives," in John  J. McCall,  ed., The Economics  of Information and 
Uncertainty (University  of Chicago  Press, 1982),  pp. 107-37. 
13. For a formal development of this point, see  Sappington, "Limited Liability 
Contracts.  " Ben S. Bernanke and John  Y. Campbell  91 
The  final  rationale  for debt, the risk-sharing  argument,  arises  because 
of market "incompleteness," in the Arrow-Debreu  sense. The idea is 
that  it pays firms  to issue debt, with its relatively  stable  payout  pattern, 
in order  to be able to borrow  at lower cost from  risk-averse  lenders.  This 
argument  is, admittedly,  difficult  tojustify  theoretically;  the  presumption 
is that  financial  intermediaries  or individuals  would  be better  placed  than 
an individual  firm  to repackage  risk. Nor is it clear that a bond with a 
fixed nominal  payout stream is the minimum-risk  instrument  that the 
firm  could  offer. Nevertheless, it appears  true  that, at low levels of debt, 
the typical  firm  can raise  funds more  cheaply through  debt than  through 
equity, even neglecting tax advantages.14 This advantage to firms of 
selling debt rather than equity may in part reflect impediments to 
diversification  and  insurance  that  exist in the economy.  15  Once  again  the 
initial  net worth of a firm  that issues debt is important;  the greater  the 
firm's  net worth, the safer  is the debt that  it can issue, and  thus  the lower 
the cost of borrowing  it will face. 
None of these explanations,  we should  emphasize,  helps with what  is 
perhaps  the deepest puzzle about  debt:  the relative  lack  of indexation  of 
debt  returns  to easily observable  aggregate  variables,  like the price  level, 
the exchange  rate, or even real GNP. All the benefits  of debt described 
above would be increased by indexing to observables. The expected 
probability  of bankruptcy  would be lowered (for example, because 
coupons would be lower in recessions); incentives would be improved; 
and risk sharing  would be facilitated. One almost wants to claim that 
there  is some sort  of general  preference  for simplicity  of contracting,  but 
such a claim does not hold up in light of the tremendously  complex 
transactions  one sees all the time in modern  financial  markets. 
MICROECONOMIC  COSTS  OF  DEBT 
For a firm  whose level of debt has become excessive, because of tax 
distortions,  errors in forecasting  firm  income, defenses against hostile 
takeovers, or the like, the microeconomic costs of high debt are the 
14. This  observation  is related  to the Mehra-Prescott  equity  premium  puzzle. Rajnish 
Mehra  and  Edward  C. Prescott, "The Equity  Premium:  A Puzzle,"  Journal of Monetary 
Economics,  vol. 15  (March  1985), pp. 145-61. 
15. N. Gregory  Mankiw,  "The Equity  Premium  and the Concentration  of Aggregate 
Shocks,"  Journal of Financial Economics,  vol. 17  (September  1986),  pp. 211-19. 92  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
mirror  image of the benefits  of debt issuance, just described. First, the 
advantage  of debt-that it is noncontingent  most  of the tirne-is balanced 
by the real  costs that  are exacted when the firm  cannot  repay, the risk  of 
which rises when debt is high relative to the firm's  financial  resources 
and income. Bankruptcy  costs are  usually  characterized  as tiny relative 
to firm  assets. Direct costs like administrative  and legal fees probably 
are small.  16 Indirect  costs, however, such as the losses due  to shutdowns 
or reorganizations  and  the destruction  of intangible  assets, may  be more 
significant. 
One argument  that bankruiptcy  costs are actually small is that such 
costs can almost  always in principle  be avoided, either  by renegotiation 
of debt terms or by acquisition  of the firm  by some third  party, and yet 
firms  are still allowed to fail. We do not find the argument  compelling. 
Renegotiation  of debts can be blocked by "free rider"  problems  among 
creditors or by the need of  creditors to  maintain a reputation for 
toughness.  17 Borrowers  must not be allowed to expect that they will be 
allowed  to renegotiate.  The purchase  of the firm  by a third  party  destroys 
what may be, in some contingencies, an important  asset of the firm, 
namely,  its limited  liability.  A third-party  purchaser  may  also not be able 
to capture  all the social benefits  of avoiding  bankruptcy;  some benefits 
will go to workers,  suppliers,  and customers. 
Beyond bankruptcy  costs, however, are near-bankruptcy  costs. Per- 
haps most important,  the theory suggests that a firm  near bankruptcy, 
with its low net worth  relative  to obligations,  will be unable  to issue new 
noncontingent  claims, except possibly at high cost. Thus it may be 
unable  to borrow  to take advantage  of productive  opportunities,  or even 
to finance  its accounts  receivable  and  its shipments  from  suppliers.  More 
broadly, the firm will find it difficult to convince anyone, including 
potential workers, managers, suppliers, and customers, to enter into 
prospectively  long-term  relationships  with it; this difficulty  reduces its 
ability  to operate  profitably.  An interesting  recent study of the Texaco- 
Pennzoil dispute by David Cutler  and Lawrence Summers  noted that 
the reductions in Texaco's  stock market value after adverse court 
decisions greatly exceeded the corresponding  increase in Pennzoil's 
16. Jerold  B. Warner,  "Bankruptcy  Costs:  Some Evidence,"  Jouinal of Finance,  vol. 
32 (May 1977),  pp. 337-47, is always  cited on this issue. 
17. Jeremy  I. Bulow and  John  B. Shoven, "The Bankruptcy  Decision," Bell Journal 
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value. The reason, presumably,  is that financial  distress has negative 
implications  for Texaco's profitability  over and beyond the money paid 
out in settlement.18 
In a similar  way, the good incentive effects of debt when bankruptcy 
risk is low are balanced  by possibly bad incentive effects when bank- 
ruptcy  risk  is high. This theme is a familiar  one in the literature  and  does 
not have to be developed here. A point perhaps  worth making,  though, 
is that the way financial  distress distorts  decisions may depend on how 
close to bankruptcy  the firm is. The managers  of a firm that is doing 
poorly but is not in immediate  danger  may become conservative-not 
introducing  new products  or modernizing,  for example-to  avoid  poten- 
tially  fatal mistakes. (We are assuming  that  managers  are not interested 
just in maximizing  firm  value per se, but in avoiding  bankruptcy.  The 
desire  to avoid bankruptcy  is reasonable  if, for example, managers  have 
job-specific human  capital  that vanishes if the firm  shuts down.) Once 
bankruptcy  becomes likely, on the other hand, gambling  becomes a 
better strategy for the managers. Again, since investors know that 
managers  of near-bankrupt  firms  may have bad incentives, they will be 
less willing  to supply  new funds to the firm  in trouble. 
Finally  we come to the risk-packaging  aspect of debt. We have argued 
that  because  of barriers  to diversification  and  insurance  in the economy, 
firms  that are able to issue safe (noncontingent)  securities can obtain a 
lower  cost of capital.  Conversely,  debt  issued  by a firm  with  low financial 
reserves  will be inherently  riskier  (the firm  cannot  guarantee  repayment 
in many circumstances), and thus will require a higher return. This 
reinforces once again a basic theme, that the inability to obtaini  new 
funds  on reasonable  terms  is a major  cost to the individual  firm  of having 
excessive debt outstanding. 
MACROECONOMIC  IMPLICATIONS  OF  HIGH  LEVELS  OF  DEBT 
Applied  economists have long thought  that the financial  condition  of 
firms  plays a role in the persistence and even the initiation  of business 
18. David M. Cutler  and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "The Costs of Conflict  Resolution 
and Financial  Distress:  Evidence  from  the Texaco-Pennzoil  Litigation,"  Working  Paper 
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cycles.19  A recent theoretical literature, building on advances in the 
economics  of asymmetric  information,  has tried  to formalize  this view.20 
The critical  element of these theories is the interaction  between firms' 
net worths  and the deadweight  losses arising  from  asymmetric  informa- 
tion. The basic idea is simple. Suppose a negative shock, perhaps a 
productivity  shock, initiates a recession and reduces the net worth of 
firms.  Because net worth  is lower, firms  find  it more costly and difficult 
to raise external  funds. Both their supply of goods and their demands 
for new capital  fall, tending  to worsen the recession. 
High levels of debt tend to magnify  the sensitivity of firm  net worth 
or equity values to aggregate  shocks. For example, in a highly levered 
firm  the percentage  decline in net worth  after  an adverse shock may be 
much  greater  than  the decline  in the valuie  of the  firm  as a whole. Another 
example, recently stressed by Bernatnke  and Gertler, is "debt-defla- 
tionf."21 In a debt-deflation,  an unanticipated  fall in the gener-al  price 
level or a slower than  expected inflation  redistributes  wealth  fronm  firms 
to creditors;  the effect is not macroeconomically  neutral,  becaulse  lower 
firm  net worth  has negative  effects on investment  and output. 
The policy implications  of these models are not completely clear. 
Although  economic fluctuations  in the Bernanke-Gertler  model are not 
first-best  (because  of the asymmetric  information),  neither  are there  any 
well-defined  externalities  that  would imply  a useful i-ole  for government 
intervention.  Bernanke  and Gertler  do suggest a limited  policy of debt 
relief, in the form of transfers  from creditors to debtors, after a debt- 
deflation;  but, as they emphasize, this policy is not Pareto-improving, 
even though  it increases  output  and some measures  of total welfare. 
To justify public  intervention  in firms'  debt decisions, there must be 
additional  imperfections  in the economy giving rise to some sort of 
aggregate externality. Probably Keynesian wage or price stickiness 
19. Otto Eckstein and Allen Sinai, "The Mechanisms  of the Business Cycle in the 
Postwar Era,"  in Robert J. Gordon, ed.,  The American Blusiness Cycle: Continuity and 
Change  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1986),  pp. 39-105. 
20. Stephen  D. Williamson,  "Financial  Intermediation,  Business Failures,  and Real 
Business  Cycles," Journal  ofPoliticalEconomy,  vol. 95 (December  1987),  pp. 1196-1216; 
Bruce Greenwald  and Joseph Stiglitz, "Information,  Finance Constraints  and Business 
Fluctuations" (Princeton University, June 1986); Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler, 
"Agency  Costs, Net Worth,  and  Business  Fluctuations'  (Princeton  University,  December 
1987). 
21. The term is due to Irving  Fisher. Ben Bernanke  and Mark  Gertler, "Financial 
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would do it, since in this case firms' spending  decisions have spillover 
effects on the aggregate  level of output and welfare.22  An alternative 
suggestion put forth by Keynesians is that the economy has multiple 
equilibria, and that the economy's "choice" of equilibrium  may be 
history-dependent,  leading  to hysteresis in the macroeconomy.23  Wide- 
spread financial  distress, through  its effect on confidence, could con- 
ceivably induce a movement to a lower equilibrium;  one could at least 
argue that such was the case during  the Depression. The existence of 
increasing  returns  is also a potential  form of aggregate  externality.24  In 
each of these cases,  high levels  of debt may act as an automatic 
destabilizer  , increasing  the sensitivity  of spending  to exogenous shocks. 
Concern  about  the level of debt would be in this case well  justified. 
An alternative,  and even more informal,  explanation  also relies on 
the possible  existence of multiple  equilibria.  The idea  is that  a succession 
of bankruptcies,  made more  likely by a high  level of debt, might  lead to 
a generalized liquidity crisis. Something of this sort appears to have 
occurred  during  the early 1930s,  although  at that time it involved banks 
more than nonfinancial  firms; some people think it nearly happened 
again  during  the Penn Central  episode in 1970.25  The argument  here is 
predicated  on the view that firms perform a liquidity-transformation 
function analogous to the one performed  by banks.26  Thus the firm's 
assets may be more illiquid  than are its liabilities. Like the bank that 
counts on only a fraction  of its depositors needing  to withdraw  cash at 
any given time, the firm  whose assets are relatively illiquid  compared 
with its liabilities  must count on being able to roll over much of its debt 
as it comes due. Confidence  is obviously crucial  in such a situation.  As 
22. John  Caskey  and  Steven  Fazzari,  "Price  Flexibility  and  Macroeconomic  Stability: 
An Empirical  Simulation  Analysis" (Washington  University,  December  1987),  work  out 
a sticky-price  model  of this sort. 
23. Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Should  Keynesian  Economics  Dispense  with  the Phillips 
Curve?" in Rod Cross, ed.,  Unemployment, Hysteresis,  and the Natural Rate Hypothesis 
(Basil  Blackwell,  1988),  pp. 11-25. 
24. Andrei  Shleifer,  "Implementation  Cycles," Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 94 
(December  1986),  pp. 1163-90. 
25. See the  description  in Marcia  Stigum,  The  Money  Market  (Dow  Jones-Irwin,  1983). 
See also "Liquidity  and Credit  in the Second Quarter,"  Federal Reserve  Bank of New 
York  Monthly  Review,  vol. 52 (August  1970),  pp. 182-86. 
26. For a formal  analysis, see Douglas W. Diamond  and Philip  H. Dybvig, "Bank 
Runs, Deposit Insurance  and Liquidity,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91 (June 
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Diamond and Dybvig show for the case of a liquidity-creating  bank, 
there  are  two classes of equilibria-  'good" equilibria  in which  confident 
depositors  withdraw  only when  genuinely  in need of liquidity  and "bad" 
equilibria  in which the fear that  the bank  cannot  honor  its commitments 
becomes self-confirming,  as depositors  run  on the bank. 
Although  firms  do not issue demand  deposits, something  like a run  is 
conceivable if all short-term  creditors  try to get out simultaneously;  the 
firm would then have difficulty  refinancing  its debt. Bankruptcies  or 
financial  distress among  some major  firms  could contribute  to a general 
liquidity  crisis in several ways. Perhaps  most important  would be the 
effect of such news on the fragile confidence that supports the first 
Diamond-Dybvig equilibrium. More directly, the legal proceedings 
initiated  by bankruptcy  would freeze the liabilities  of the failing  firms, 
converting  assets that the firms'  creditors  may have previously  consid- 
ered to be fairly liquid  into illiquid  assets and worsening  the illiquidity 
problem  of the creditors.  Similarly,  major  bankruptcies  might  contribute 
to cash-flow problems of the firms' suppliers and customers. As the 
liquidity  crisis of the 1930s seriously disrupted  the ability of banks to 
function, a corporate  liquidity  crisis could disrupt  the production  and 
investment activities of firms. In such a  situation, the liquidity of 
nonfinancial  firms  and of banks  would be closely intertwined,  because, 
for example,  most firms  back  their  commercial  paper  issuance  with  bank 
lines of credit, which would provide relief in a crisis only if the banks 
remained  liquid.27 
This particular  scenario is speculative. As noted, the liquidity  crisis 
of the Depression  was focused primarily  on financial  institutions;  major 
corporations  entered the 1930s  with large cash cushions and remained 
relatively liquid throughout  the decade. Thus we do not have a clear 
example of a corporate  liquidity  crisis to which to point; we raise this 
only as a possibility. The macroeconomic implications of financial 
structure  remain  a rich  field  for theorists. Based on what  we know now, 
however, there does seem to be reason for macroeconomists  to pay 
attention  to the mixture  of corporate  debt and equity in the economy. 
We turn next to some empirical  measures  of the importance  of debt in 
the U.S. economy. 
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Measures of Corporate Financial Stability 
We first look at the extent to which the recent growth of corporate 
debt has affected basic measures of corporate  financial  stability  based 
on aggregate  averages. Because what is important  is not debt itself, but 
debt relative  to the value of the firm,  we focus on debt-to-asset  ratios  as 
our basic indicators  of financial  conditions. 
Six measures of aggregate  debt-asset ratios for U.S.  corporations 
during 1969-86 are given in table 3, which is, except for the last two 
columns, essentially an update of similar tables reported by Robert 
Taggart.28  The six columns of table 3 tell a reasonably  consistent story. 
Aggregate debt-asset ratios have been either flat or mildly upward 
sloping.  The  two measures  that  include  a market  value  of equity  (columns 
1 and 4) show a large increase in the debt-asset ratio in 1974,  a year in 
which the stock market  fell sharply.  Some of the 1974  increase appears 
to have been permanent.  There is no evidence in this table that debt- 
asset ratios in the 1980s  have been high relative to the post-oil shock 
1970s.29 
The measures in table 3 present several problems, however. First, 
only the Holland-Myers  approach  (column 4) uses a market value of 
debt, and  it is rather  crude.30  But given the volatility  of inflation  over the 
sample  period,  it is likely that  market  values have fluctuated  much  more 
than book values.  Further, it is  the market value of  debt that is 
economically significant,  since presumably  firms  can always refinance 
existing debt at current interest rates, thereby effectively redeeming 
their  outstanding  debt at market  value. 
Second, the aggregate debt-asset ratios in table 3 may conceal 
important  variations  in the cross-sectional  distribution  of this variable. 
Because a primary  concern in evaluating  the risk of a financial  crisis is 
28. Taggart,  "Secular  Patterns  in the Financing  of U.S. Corporations." 
29. As we have already noted, Taggart's  work shows that debt-asset ratios were 
generally  lower in the 1950s  and 1960s  than  in our sample  period,  but in a long historical 
perspective  those two decades  appear  to be exceptional. 
30. In general  the market  value of long-term  corporate  debt  depends  on the pattern  of 
interest  rates over previous  years, a principle  that  is ignored  when capitalization  is done 
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Table 3.  Alternative Aggregate Debt-Asset Ratios,  1969-86 
Internal Revenlie  Service  Holland  COMPUSTAT 
Flow-of-  All  Manulfacturing  and  Fixed  Growving 
Year  Flunds  corporations  corporations  Myers  sample  sample 
1969  0.34  0.70  0.45  0.22  0.31  0.31 
1970  0.35  0.71  0.49  0.28  0.32  0.31 
1971  0.33  0.72  0.49  0.26  0.32  0.30 
1972  0.33  0.72  0.49  0.25  0.31  0.30 
1973  0.35  0.73  0.51  0.29  0.30  0.28 
1974  0.51  0.74  0.53  0.39  0.30  0.29 
1975  0.44  0.74  0.52  0.31  0.29  0.31 
1976  0.43  0.74  0.53  0.27  0.28  0.29 
1977  0.47  0.74  0.53  0.33  0.27  0.28 
1978  0.49  0.75  0.54  0.35  0.26  0.27 
1979  0.47  0.74  0.55  0.35  0.25  0.27 
1980  0.41  0.74  0.56  0.32  0.25  0.27 
1981  0.45  0.74  0.53  0.29  0.26  0.27 
1982  0.44  0.74  0.57  0.31  0.27  0.27 
1983  0.41  0.74  0.57  0.25  0.25  0.25 
1984  0.45  0.74  0.58  0.27  0.26  0.26 
1985  0.43  n.a.  n.a.  0.29  0.27  0.26 
1986  0.42  n.a.  n.a.  0.30  0.28  0.27 
Sources:  Column I is total credit market instruments of nonfinancial corporations measured at book value,  divided 
by the  sum of credit market instruments and the market value  of equity,  as reported in Board of Governors  of the 
Federal Reserve  System,  "Balance  Sheets for the U.S.  Economy,  1946-85"  and "Flow  of Funds Accounts,"  various 
issues.  Columns 2 and 3 are total debt divided by total assets  (all at book value), as reported in U.S.  Internal Revenue 
Service,  Statistics  of Iticonie,  various  issues.  Column 4,  using the approach of  Holland  and Myers,  is the ratio of 
the market value of nonfinancial corporate  debt to the sum of the market values  of nonfinancial corporate debt and 
equity; the aggregate market values of corporate debt and equity are measured as the capitalized values of nonfinancial 
corporate  net interest  and dividends  (from the National  Income  and Product  Accounts),  where  capitalization  rates 
are the Baa corporate bond rate and the Standard and Poor's 500 dividend yield,  respectively.  See Daniel M. Holland 
and Stewart C. Myers,  "Trends in Corporate Profitability and Capital Costs"  in Robert Lindsay,  ed.,  The Nationi's 
Capital Needs:  Three Stuidies (New  York: Committee  for Economic  Development,  1979), pp.  103-88.  The  last two 
coluimns of the table use a fixed sample (column 5) of 643 COMPUSTAT  firms (the firms for which all relevant data 
are available continuously  over  1969-86) and a growing sample (column 6) of COMPUSTAT  firms (including in each 
year all firms for which data are available  in that year). The  numbers reported in columns  5 and 6 are the ratios of 
book-value  debt to book-value  assets. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
the number of firms that would be in financial distress in the event of a 
major shock,  the upper tail of the debt-asset  distribution is of greater 
interest than the mean or median value. 
To get at the issue of the size of the tail, one needs panel data on firm 
balance sheets;  although not essential,  such panel data are also helpful 
for calculating market values of debt, since they can be used to infer the 
maturity  structure of  outstanding  debt.  For  this  study  we  focus  our 
attention on the COMPUSTAT data set. We had available the primary, Ben S. Bernanke and John  Y. Campbell  99 
supplementary,  and  tertiary  COMPUSTAT  files;  after  eliminating  finan- 
cial corporations  (SIC 6) and  firms  with essential missing  data, we had a 
sample  that started  with some 700 firms  in 1969  and grew to some 1,400 
firms  by 1986.  About  650  firms  had  data  available  consistently  throughout 
the sample  period;  we dubbed  this our fixed sample, as opposed to the 
growing  sample, which includes  firms  added  to the COMPUSTAT  data 
base over time. 
COMPUSTAT's  advantages  are its familiarity  and completeness. Its 
primary  disadvantage  is that the firms  for which it provides data, being 
both publicly  traded  and larger  than  typical  firms,  may not be represen- 
tative of U.S.  nonfinancial  corporations as a whole. In table 2, for 
example, the dividend payments of the 643 firms in our fixed sample 
amount  to almost half the total dividend  payments of the nonfinancial 
corporate  sector in 1986,  but the debt issue of these firms  is only about 
one-fifth  the total for the sector. The ratio of dividends  to debt issue is 
similarly  disproportionate  for our growing  sample of firms.  The reason 
presumably  is the high weight in our sample  of large, mature  firms  that 
pay larger dividends and issue less debt, relative to their size, than 
smaller  firms. 
The COMPUSTAT  data set also includes  only firms  that  were viable 
and  publicly  traded  at the end of the sample  period. Firms  that  failed or 
went private during  the period are excluded throughout.  This "survi- 
vorship  bias" could lead us to understate  increases in debt-asset  ratios, 
if leverage  has increased  primarily  in firms  that have gone private.31  On 
the other hand, firms whose financial  conditions deteriorated  early in 
the sample, and that subsequently  failed, are excluded while firms  with 
deteriorating  conditions  in the past few years remain  in the sample.  This 
bias  works  to overstate  increases  in debt-asset  ratios, although  its effect 
is very likely smaller than the understatement  arising from omitted 
private  firms.  Despite these caveats about our COMPUSTAT  sample, 
we note that the results we obtain  are qualitatively  similar  to those for 
the corporate  sector as a whole, reported  in table 3, column 1. 
Our  first  major  undertaking  was to construct  market  debt-asset  ratios 
31. Michael  Jensen, "Takeovers:  Causes and Consequences,"  reports  that the total 
market  value  of firms  that  went private  was $37.4  billion  in 1985  and  $44.3  billion  in 1986. 
The ultimate  source  of this  information  is Mergerstat Review (W.  T. Grimm  and  Co., 1985 
and  1986  annual  issues). Substantial  debt  issue  was  associated  with  many  of these  corporate 
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for each firm  in each year. Because market  equity values are available, 
the main problem  was to assign market  values for outstanding  debt.3" 
We used a variety  of different  methods, which we briefly  describe  in the 
next section. 
CALCULATING  MARKET  VALUES  OF  DEBT 
We began by ignoring  special features that exist on some corporate 
debt issues, such as call provisions.33  Then the market  value of a debt 
issue can be calculated  from  its book value, maturity,  coupon rate, and 
yield to maturity,  using  the standard  present-value  formulas.  The market 
value of a firm's  debt is simply  the sum  of the values of individual  issues 
of different  maturities. 
The COMPUSTAT  tape has only minimal  direct information  on the 
variables  that enter the present-value  formula  for debt. The tape does 
report  the total book value of short-term  debt (under  one-year  maturity 
at issue) and long-term  debt (over one-year  maturity  at issue), and also 
the book-value  maturity  distribution  of outstanding  long-term  debt out 
to five years.34 
The procedure  introduced  by William  Brainard,  John Shoven, and 
Laurence  Weiss (BSW), and subsequently  applied  by others, uses the 
total short- and long-term debt numbers and imputes the maturity 
distribution  of long-term  debt.35  Each firm  is followed through  time; at 
the starting  date, it is assumed  that  the maturity  distribution  of the firm's 
long-term debt is equal to the aggregate average for that date. The 
32. Actually,  only  common  stock  values  are  directly  available.  We  calculated  preferred 
stock values by capitalizing  each firm's  preferred  dividend  payments  by the aggregate 
preferred  dividend  yield. 
33. Ben Friedman  suggested  to us that ignoring  call provisions  may be an important 
omission during  the 1980s,  when interest  rates fell sharply.  In this case, reported  book 
values may  be better  measures  of market  value than  our  constructed  numbers.  Column  1 
of table  3 reports  the ratio  of book  value  of debt  to market  value  of equity  for the corporate 
sector  as a whole. The behavior  of this series is qualitatively  similar  to that  of our  market- 
value series. At no time in the 1980s has this ratio been as high as it was in 1974  or 
1977-79. 
34. That  is, the tape reports  the book value of long-term  debt due in under  one year, 
due in one to two years, and so on out to five years. These numbers  are available  starting 
in 1974  for some firms. 
35. William  C. Brainard,  John B. Shoven, and Laurence Weiss, "The Financial 
Valuation  of the Return  to Capital,"  BPEA,  2:1980,  pp. 453-502. We are grateful  to John 
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maturity  distribution  is updated  each year, assuming  that  net new issues 
have a 20-year  maturity  and  that  net retirements  apply  to all outstanding 
issues proportionately.  The net issue number  is obtained  as the change 
in total  book value of long-term  debt, adjusted  for maturing  issues. Once 
the maturity  distribution  of long-term  debt is obtained,  the BSW proce- 
dure  assumes that each issue has a coupon rate equal to the Baa rate at 
the time of issue, and a yield to maturity  equal  to the current  Baa rate.36 
The BSW  method  does not use the information  directly  available  from 
COMPUSTAT  on the maturity  distribution  of long-term  debt out to five 
years' maturity.  A simple  modification  of the approach  is to replace  the 
first  five years of the BSW maturity  distribution  with the COMPUSTAT 
numbers,  scaling  the remainder  of the BSW distribution  up or down in 
proportion  to remain  consistent with the COMPUSTAT  figure  on total 
long-term  debt.37  The modified  distribution  is then carried  forward  to 
the next year and  updated  in the manner  of BSW. 
We calculated market values of debt using both the plain and the 
modified  BSW method  for both our fixed and growing  samples  of firms, 
assuming  that  the maturity  of long-terfn  corporate  debt at issue is either 
10  or20  years.  These  eight  alternative  calculations  yielded  similarresults; 
in the next section, therefore,  we report  the results using the modified 
BSW  method  with  a growing  sample  and  a 20-year  debt  maturity  at issue. 
The BSW approach  does not use information  on net interest  paid by 
the firm, which is available. Ideally, the interest numbers should be 
incorporated  into the BSW calculation,  and we made several attempts 
to do so. But while on average  the ratios  of interest  to book value of debt 
reported  by COMPUSTAT  look reasonable,  for a substantial  minority 
of firms  reported  interest  expense and book values of debt appear  to be 
inconsistent,  in that  there  is no possible maturity  structure  for which the 
implied  average coupon rate is reasonable. Rather  than simply ignore 
the information  on interest  paid, which may be more accurate  than the 
debt numbers,  we used it as the basis of a separate  calculation.38 
36. A fixed-maturity  (approximately  10-year)  Baa  rate  is used. 
37. One way to justify this is to imagine  that the firm  refinances  its debt each year to 
adjust  the maturity  distribution. 
38. For an independent  confirmation  of the accuracy  of the basic BSW method  that 
uses book value of debt data, see John H. Ciccolo, Jr., "Changing  Balance Sheet 
Relationships  in the U.S. Manufacturing  Sector," in Benjamin  M. Friedman,  ed., The 
Changing Roles  of Debt and Equity in Financing  U.S.  Capital Formation  (University  of 
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We began by computing  the interest  payments implied  by the BSW 
method. Then we scaled up the BSW market  value of debt by the ratio 
of reported  to implied  interest. One can think  of this as using the BSW 
maturity structure, plus historical coupon rates, to allocate reported 
interest  to obligations  at different  maturities.  Below we present  market- 
value debt-asset ratios computed in this way, as an alternative  to the 
more usual  methods. 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  DEBT-ASSET  RATIOS 
We now present  distributions  of market-value  debt-asset  ratios over 
time for each of two imputation  methods. Method A is the Brainard- 
Shoven-Weiss  approach,  modified  to reflect  additional  sample  informa- 
tion, when available, about the maturity  structures  of firms' debt. We 
assume that  long-term  debt is issued at a 20-year  maturity.  In Method  B 
the market  value of debt is measured  by capitalizing  reported  interest 
payments,  using  the debt  maturity  structure  and  coupon  rates  implied  in 
each year by Method  A. 
Both methods use the growing sample of firms (the fixed-sample 
results  were very similar).  In table  4 we report  results  for the full sample 
(that  is, the total market  value of debt divided  by the total market  value 
of assets, or equivalently  the value-weighted  mean debt-asset ratio for 
the sample).  In  table  5 we report  the 50th,  90th,  95th,  and  99th  percentiles 
of the debt-asset  distribution.39 
The results obtained  by Methods A and B are reassuringly  similar; 
both are  quite  different  from  the book-value  methods. Because a variety 
of permutations  of the market-value  calculation  not reported  in the table 
also gave similar  results,  we feel relatively  confident  about  the  conversion 
of debt numbers  to market  values. 
39. The percentiles  in table 5 are calculated  on an equal-weighted  basis, but we also 
computed  value-weighted  percentiles.  In the equal-weighted  calculation,  a firm  at the  95th 
percentile  has  a higher  debt-asset  ratio  than  95 percent  of all the firms  in the sample  in that 
year. In the value-weighted  calculation,  the firms  with debt-asset  ratios lower than the 
95th percentile  firm  have an aggregate  market  asset value equal  to 95 percent  of the total 
value of firms  in that year. If debt-asset  ratios  are larger  for smaller  firms,  then the debt- 
asset ratios  at a given  point  in the  right-hand  tail  should  be higher  under  the equal-weighted 
method  than  under  the value-weighted  method.  We found  this to be the case empirically, 
but the movements  over time in the value-weighted  percentiles  were almost  identical  to 
those in the equal-weighted  percentiles. Ben S. Bernanke and John  Y. Campbell  103 
Table 4.  Book-Value and Market-Value Debt-Asset Ratios, 
COMPUSTAT Firms,  1969-86 
Market  valuea  Number  of 
Book-  Method  Method  firms in 
Year  value  Ab  Bc  sample 
1969  0.300  0.260  0.254  643 
1970  0.290  0.257  0.247  695 
1971  0.281  0.247  0.234  747 
1972  0.268  0.235  0.219  800 
1973  0.257  0.270  0.267  859 
1974  0.283  0.368  0.388  902 
1975  0.287  0.325  0.334  932 
1976  0.272  0.303  0.308  966 
1977  0.273  0.345  0.354  1,013 
1978  0.266  0.350  0.365  1,051 
1979  0.264  0.336  0.351  1,085 
1980  0.251  0.286  0.308  1,122 
1981  0.263  0.317  0.344  1,169 
1982  0.257  0.308  0.330  1,197 
1983  0.241  0.286  0.303  1,259 
1984  0.248  0.304  0.309  1,321 
1985  0.256  0.298  0.288  1,386 
1986  0.273  0.311  0.298  1,386 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations  using the COMPUSTAT  data base. 
a.  The numbers are the ratios of the total market value of debt for the sample to the total market value of assets. 
Equivalently,  they are the value-weighted  mean debt-asset  ratios for the sample. 
b.  Brainard-Shoven-Weiss  approach,  modified to reflect additional sample information (when available) about the 
maturity  structures  of firms'  debt. Long-term  debt  is assumed  to be issued  at a 20-year  maturity.  See text description 
and  William  C. Brainard,  John  B. Shoven,  and  Laurence  Weiss, "The  Financial  Valuation  of the Return  to Capital," 
BPEA, 2:1980,  pp. 453-502. 
c. The market  value of debt is measured  by capitalizing  reported  interest  payments,  using the debt maturity 
structure  and  coupon  rates  implied  in each year  by Method  A. 
The market debt-asset ratios at all points of the cross-sectional 
distribution  of firms  show the same recent historical  pattern.  There  was 
a corporate  debt crisis in 1974, in the sense that debt-asset ratios rose 
sharply.  Debt-asset  ratios  fell slowly after 1974  until  perhaps  about 1980. 
There has been no significant  trend in this measure during  the 1980s 
because the recent growth of total debt has been offset by the rising 
stock market. Whether the stock market crash of  1987 affects this 
conclusion is discussed later. Our calculation, which always uses the 
Baa bond rate, ignores the possibility that there have been net down- 
gradings recently; if downgradings have been important, then our 
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FLOW  MEASURES  OF  FINANCIAL  STABILITY 
The ratio of the market  value of debt to the market  value of assets 
seems to us to be the best single  indicator  of the solvency of the corporate 
sector. Nevertheless, numerous other measures of liquidity and sol- 
vency, used for example by professional bond raters, do not rely on 
stock market  values.40  There  are several  good reasons to consider  these 
as well.  First, the stock market may not be a reliable measure of 
fundamental  valuation. Second, from a policy perspective, we should 
be interested in worst-case scenarios as well as the average expected 
outcome  reflected  in even correctly  priced  equities. 
A popular  flow measure  of financial  soundness  is the ratio  of interest 
paid by the firm  to cash flow before depreciation,  taxes, and interest. 
Obviously  a liquidity  rather  than  a solvency measure,  this  ratio  describes 
the pressure  exerted by interest  payments  on current  cash flows. Table 
6 gives the equal-weighted  distribution  of this measure.  Table 7 reports 
a similar  measure  that distinguishes  between nominal  and real interest; 
here the numerator  is a crude measure  of real interest  paid by the firm, 
rather  than  nominal  interest. Table 8 gives the distribution  for the basic 
measure, with current  cash flow replaced by an average of cash flow 
over the current  and  the two previous  years. 
Because of high  real interest  rates in the 1980s  and the legacy of high 
nominal  interest rates during  the 1970s, and because the firms in our 
sample had relatively poor average earnings during the 1980s, both 
absolutely and relative to national averages, all measures of interest 
expense have risen significantly  recently. The increase is particularly 
striking  for the real interest expense statistic (table 7). Even at the 
median,  the current  burden  of real  interest  payments  has approximately 
quadrupled  since the late 1970s.  This pressure  on cash flows may be the 
proximate  reason  for the increased  number  of bond  downgradings  noted 
by Kaufman  and  others. 
40.  Harlan D.  Platt,  Why Companies  Fail:  Strategies  for  Detecting,  Avoiding,  and 
Profiting from Bankruiptcy (Lexington  Books,  1985), chap.  8, discusses  the use of flow 
measures for predicting bankruptcy and reviews earlier statistical studies. There seems to 
have  been little structural modeling  of the determinants of bankruptcy; the forecasting 
equations that are used are "best-fit" reduced forms. See also Edward I. Altman, Corporate 
Bankruptcy in America (Lexington  Books,  1971). 106  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 6.  Interest Expense as a Ratio to Cash Flow, COMPUSTAT Firms,  1969-86a 
Number  of 
Full  firms in 
Year  sample  50  90  95  sample 
1969  0.12  0.13  0.34  0.44  643 
1970  0.14  0.16  0.46  1.07  695 
1971  0.13  0.16  0.44  0.89  747 
1972  0.12  0.14  0.37  0.50  800 
1973  0.12  0.14  0.38  0.50  859 
1974  0.13  0.18  0.53  0.90  902 
1975  0.15  0.19  0.47  0.76  932 
1976  0.14  0.14  0.38  0.53  966 
1977  0.14  0.15  0.41  0.62  1,013 
1978  0.14  0.15  0.41  0.57  1,051 
1979  0.14  0.17  0.47  0.66  1,085 
1980  0.18  0.20  0.56  0.95  1,122 
1981  0.21  0.22  0.66  1.28  1,169 
1982  0.22  0.24  1.18  0  1,197 
1983  0.18  0.20  0.99  0  1,259 
1984  0.18  0.19  0.81  0  1,321 
1985  0.18  0.21  1.67  0  1,386 
1986  0.20  0.22  1.65  0  1,386 
Source:  Same as table 5. 
a.  This  table  shows  the  ratio of  interest  expense  to  operating  income  before  depreciation,  taxes,  and  interest 
expense.  Negative  values  and values  greater than 100 are shown  as  +  .  A column for the 99th percentile is omitted 
as almost all values  are  + -. 
Instead  of measuring  interest  costs relative to the current  cash flow, 
table 9 measures interest relative to current assets. Current  assets, 
defined as the sum of cash and equivalents, receivables, inventories, 
and some miscellaneous items, may be a better indicator  of a firm's 
ability to meet its interest obligations than is income, particularly  if 
current income has a large transitory component. This ratio does 
deteriorate  over our sample period but less dramatically  than does the 
interest-to-cash-flow  ratio;  it tends gradually  upward  with something  of 
a break  around  1980. 
Another  variable  of interest  is the proportion  of debt at market  value 
that is due within the year. A high ratio of debt due in the near term 
would signify pressure on firms either to find refinancing  or to repay 
principal  out of current  earnings.  As table 10 shows, however, there is 
virtually  no trend  in this ratio. Ben S. Bernanke and John  Y. Campbell  107 
Table 7.  Real Interest Expense as a Ratio to Cash Flow, COMPUSTAT Firms,  1969-86a 
Number  of 
Full  firms in 
Year  sample  50  90  95  sample 
1969  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  643 
1970  0.06  0.06  0.18  0.42  695 
1971  0.04  0.05  0.15  0.29  747 
1972  0.05  0.06  0.15  0.21  800 
1973  0.03  0.03  0.08  0.11  859 
1974  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.04  902 
1975  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.06  932 
1976  0.05  0.05  0.13  0.18  966 
1977  0.04  0.04  0.11  0.16  1,013 
1978  0.03  0.04  0.09  0.13  1,051 
1979  0.02  0.03  0.08  0.11  1,085 
1980  0.06  0.07  0.19  0.32  1,122 
1981  0.08  0.09  0.26  0.51  1,169 
1982  0.13  0.15  0.71  0o  1,197 
1983  0.13  0.14  0.70  0o  1,259 
1984  0.13  0.14  0.60  3.15  1,321 
1985  0.14  0.16  1.24  0  1,386 
1986  0.15  0.17  1.23  0o  1,386 
Source:  Same as table 5. 
a.  The  numbers in this table are the numbers in table 6,  multiplied by the ratio of the Baa rate less  the ex  post 
inflation rate to the Baa rate. Negative  values  and values  greater than 100 are shown as  +-.  A column for the 99th 
percentile  is omitted as almost all values  are  +-. 
The variables  considered  in this section concern  liquidity,  as opposed 
to solvency. They give mixed results. The ratios  of interest  to cash flow 
and  current  assets show signs  of stress, but  there  is no increased  reliance 
on short-term  debt. In relatively  normal  times, at least, liquidity  is less 
important  than  solvency, since a solvent  firm  will  be able  to find  financing 
to cover any liquidity  problems.  As discussed earlier,  in a crisis atmos- 
phere  liquidity  may become more important,  in which case our findings 
carry  some possibly worrisome  implications. 
The conflict between the results in tables 6-9  and the debt-asset 
measures  in tables  4 and  5 reflects  stock prices, as is clear  from  table 11. 
There has been a remarkable  swing in price-earnings  ratios in the past 
two decades, with ratios in the late 1960s  and recent years, even after 
the crash  of 1987,  being  high  relative  to historical  norms  and  those in the 
mid-1970s  being  unusually  low. Thus debt growth  has been matched  by 
growth  in equity  values, leaving  debt-asset  ratios  essentially  unchanged; 108  Brookings Papers  on Econiomic Activity,  1:1988 
Table 8.  Interest Expense as a Ratio to a Three-Year Moving Average 
of Cash Flow, COMPUSTAT Firms,  1971-86a 
Percentile  Number  of 
Full  firms  in 
Year  sample  50  90  95  sample 
1971  0.14  0.17  0.44  0.67  747 
1972  0.14  0.16  0.44  0.63  800 
1973  0.14  0.18  0.48  0.73  859 
1974  0.16  0.21  0.55  0.82  902 
1975  0.16  0.19  0.49  0.63  932 
1976  0.15  0.17  0.42  0.58  966 
1977  0.15  0.17  0.44  0.64  1,013 
1978  0.16  0.18  0.47  0.69  1,051 
1979  0.16  0.20  0.53  0.73  1,085 
1980  0.19  0.21  0.57  0.85  1,122 
1981  0.22  0.24  0.68  1.11  1,169 
1982  0.23  0.24  0.74  1.32  1,197 
1983  0.21  0.21  0.77  1.33  1,259 
1984  0.20  0.23  0.97  2.01  1,321 
1985  0.19  0.23  0.98  4.43  1,386 
1986  0.20  0.23  1.02  4.70  1,386 
Source:  Same as table 5. 
a.  The numbers are defined as in table 5, with the average of current and two previous  years of operating income 
replacing current operating income.  Negative  values  and values  greater than  100 are shown  as  +-.  A column  for 
the 99th percentile  is omitted as almost all values  are  +  . 
but debt growth has significantly  outstripped  earnings  growth, leading 
to increased  interest  burdens. 
CORPORATE  FINANCIAL  CONDITIONS  AND  BANKRUPTCY  RISK 
The analysis  of the previous section helps us measure  changes  in the 
financial  conditions  of firms,  but it does not provide  direct  estimates of 
increases in bankruptcy  risk. A complete analysis of the connection 
between financial  conditions  and  bankruptcy  risk  is beyond  the scope of 
the paper,  but we do try two empirical  exercises that shed some light  on 
the issue. First, we study the experience of a large  firm  that came close 
to bankruptcy  in the middle  of our sample  period;  and second, we look 
at trends  in a reduced-form  measure  that  is commonly  used by business 
economists as an indicator  of bankruptcy  risk. 
The  Chrysler  Episode. In table 12  we report  stock and  flow measures 
of the financial condition of Chrysler Corporation  over our sample 
period. During the late 1970s, Chrysler  faced serious difficulties that Ben S. Bernanke and John  Y. Campbell  109 
Table  9. Ratio  of Interest  Expense  to Current  Assets, COMPUSTAT  Firms, 1969_86a 
Percentile  Number  of 
Full  firms in 
Year  sample  50  90  95  99  sample 
1969  0.04  0.04  0.23  0.34  0.59  643 
1970  0.05  0.04  0.25  0.40  0.62  694 
1971  0.05  0.04  0.24  0.38  0.62  746 
1972  0.05  0.04  0.23  0.37  0.59  799 
1973  0.05  0.04  0.24  0.39  0.64  857 
1974  0.06  0.05  0.27  0.37  0.58  900 
1975  0.07  0.05  0.25  0.40  0.60  929 
1976  0.06  0.04  0.24  0.36  0.55  962 
1977  0.06  0.04  0.22  0.34  0.54  1,006 
1978  0.06  0.05  0.22  0.36  0.57  1,044 
1979  0.06  0.05  0.22  0.38  0.59  1,078 
1980  0.07  0.06  0.23  0.39  0.65  1,117 
1981  0.09  0.06  0.26  0.42  0.70  1,162 
1982  0.10  0.06  0.27  0.42  0.71  1,190 
1983  0.09  0.05  0.26  0.39  0.69  1,252 
1984  0.09  0.06  0.25  0.39  0.72  1,313 
1985  0.08  0.06  0.26  0.39  0.75  1,378 
1986  0.08  0.06  0.28  0.38  0.78  1,378 
Source:  Same as table 5. 
a.  Current assets  are defined as the sum of cash,  receivables,  inventories,  and other miscellaneous  items. 
called forth a federal rescue operation. As  a result of federal loan 
guarantees,  the firm  was able to increase the market  value of its debt 
about 50 percent in 1980, gradually  reducing  its debt burden  over the 
following  years. 
In  table 12  both stock and  flow  measures  appear  to be useful  indicators 
of corporate  financial  distress. Chrysler's  debt-asset  ratio  rose from  0.3 
in 1972,  to 0.6 in 1973,  to 0.8 in 1974.  It then fell below 0.5 in 1976,  but 
rose above 0.6 for the next three years and returned  to 1974  levels in 
1980 and 1981 when the new, federally guaranteed  debt was issued. 
Since then it has fallen back below 0.4. The ratio of interest  expense to 
cash flow is a rather  noisy series, but it too indicates serious problems 
in 1978-80.  It rose above 1.0 in 1979,  and  in 1979  and 1980  cash flow was 
negative.  The  ratio  of interest  expense to current  assets also deteriorated 
in 1980. 
Equations for Bankruptcy Risk.  The solvency  and liquidity measures 
we have presented  so far  focus on firm  liabilities-outstanding debt and 
interest  burden.  However, specialists in predicting  financial  distress or 110  Brookings Papers  on Econiomic Activity,  1:1988 
Table 10.  Ratio of Debt Due in One Year to Total Debt, COMPUSTAT Firms,  1969-86a 
Niumber of 
Full  firims in 
Year  sample  50  90  95  99  sample 
1969  0.20  0.16  0.57  0.71  0.93  643 
1970  0.22  0.15  0.56  0.69  0.87  695 
1971  0.18  0.10  0.48  0.61  0.87  747 
1972  0.15  0.08  0.47  0.63  0.90  800 
1973  0.16  0.11  0.48  0.67  0.92  859 
1974  0.24  0.20  0.59  0.69  0.93  902 
1975  0.17  0.15  0.48  0.62  0.90  932 
1976  0.15  0.12  0.45  0.64  0.92  966 
1977  0.15  0.12  0.46  0.63  0.90  1,013 
1978  0.16  0.13  0.47  0.61  0.90  1,051 
1979  0.19  0.15  0.51  0.68  0.91  1,085 
1980  0.21  0.16  0.54  0.71  0.90  1,122 
1981  0.22  0.18  0.59  0.72  0.91  1,169 
1982  0.19  0.15  0.54  0.69  0.89  1,197 
1983  0.15  0.13  0.50  0.68  0.91  1,259 
1984  0.17  0.14  0.57  0.73  0.96  1,321 
1985  0.17  0.14  0.55  0.72  0.97  1,386 
1986  0.16  0.12  0.55  0.74  0.97  1,386 
Source:  Same as table 5. 
a.  At market values.  Debt due in one  year includes  short-term debt and maturing long-term debt. 
bankruptcy  typically  pay at least as much attention  to indicators  of the 
fundamental  health  of the firm's  business, such as sales and  profits.  For 
example, Altman's "Z-score model" proposes the following indicator 
of solvency: 
Z  =  1.2 WCTA +  1.4 RETA +  3.3 EBIT +  0.6 MEBD  +  1.0 SLTA, 
where Z is the firm's Z-score, WCTA  is the ratio of working  capital to 
total assets, RETA  is the ratio  of retained  earnings  to total assets, EBIT 
is earnings  before interest and taxes, MEBD is the ratio of the market 
value of equity to the book value of debt, and SLTA  is the ratio  of sales 
to total assets.41 Higher Z-scores imply greater solvency. In Altman's 
sample the average nonbankrupt  firm  had a Z-score of 4.89, while the 
41. Edward  I. Altman,  "The  Z-Score  Bankruptcy  Model:  Past, Present,  and  Future," 
in Altman and Arnold W. Sametz,  eds.,  Financial  Crises: Institutions  and Markets in a 
Fragile  Environment  (John  Wiley  and  Sons, 1977),  pp.  89-108.  See also  chapter7,  "Failure- 
Prediction Models for Nonfinancial  Firms," in Altman and others, Applications of 
Classification  Techniques in Business,  Banking and Finance  (JAI Press,  1981). Ben S. Ber-nanike  and John  Y. Campbell  111 
Table 11.  Price-Earnings Ratios, COMPUSTAT Firms,  1969-86 a 
Percetitile  Number  of 
Full  firms in 
Year  sample  50  90  sample 
1969  16.17  14.43  41.98  643 
1970  16.81  15.05  79.92  695 
1971  19.11  17.25  97.59  747 
1972  16.81  14.22  47.23  800 
1973  9.95  7.68  27.22  859 
1974  6.16  5.35  24.58  902 
1975  8.84  7.82  34.70  932 
1976  9.13  8.46  19.26  966 
1977  8.26  7.85  17.72  1,013 
1978  7.48  7.11  15.88  1,051 
1979  7.73  7.38  20.18  1,085 
1980  10.15  9.09  41.72  1,122 
1981  9.00  8.36  51.29  1,169 
1982  14.97  12.67  oo  1,197 
1983  15.60  13.99  oo  1,259 
1984  11.56  11.09  oo  1,321 
1985  19.36  15.74  x  1,386 
1986  23.02  17.11  cc  1,386 
Source:  Same as table 5. 
a.  Negative  values  are shown  as  +  Columns for the 95th and 99th percentiles  are omitted  as almost all values 
are  +x,. 
average bankrupt  firm  had a Z-score of -0.26  one year before bank- 
ruptcy. 
To obtain  yet one more measure,  albeit  crude, of the financial  health 
of the corporate  sector, we calculated  the distribution  of Z-scores for 
the firms  in our  growing  sample  for each year.42  The results  are reported 
in table 13. We obtained  arithmetic  mean  Z-scores (not  reported)  similar 
to the 4.89 cited by Altman  for nonbankrupt  firms,  although  the median 
and full-sample  value-weighted  mean scores were somewhat  lower. A 
large  fraction  of our sample  throughout  had scores below the 1.81 that 
Altman used as the cutoff for treating  firms as likely bankrupts;  this 
suggests to us that differences in samples and perhaps some small 
differences  in variable  definitions  make our Z-scores and Altman's  not 
directly comparable.  Nevertheless, there may be some information  in 
42. This certainly  stretches  the application  of Altman's  method  beyond  the purposes 
for which  it was designed.  Among  other  things,  it is heroic  to assume  that  the relationship 
between  Z-scores  and  bankruptcy  risk  will remain  stable  over time. (Altman  calls this the 
time series problem;  macroeconomists  would  call it an application  of the Lucas critique.) 112  Brookings  Papers  on  Econonmic  Activity,  1:1988 
Table 12.  Stock and Flow Measures of the Financial Condition 
of Chrysler Corporation, 1969-86 
Market  Market 
value of  value of 
debt  equity 
(millions  (millions  Interest-  Interest- 
of  of  Debt-  cash  cuirrent 
current  current  asset  flow  assets 
Year  dollars)  dollars)  r  atioa  r  atiob  ratioc 
1969  1,007  1,648  0.379  0.06  0.02 
1970  1,062  1,386  0.434  0.12  0.02 
1971  1,125  1,458  0.435  0.12  0.03 
1972  1,049  2,147  0.328  0.07  0.02 
1973  1,252  851  0.595  0.04  0.01 
1974  1,665  422  0.798  0.61  0.05 
1975  1,344  609  0.688  0.66  0.07 
1976  1,186  1,228  0.491  0.17  0.05 
1  977  1,526  761  0.667  0.29  0.05 
1978  1,179  716  0.622  1.16  0.05 
1979  1,724  768  0.692  00  0.09 
1980  2,576  600  0.811  00  0.14 
1981  1,855  469  0.798  1.62  0.16 
1982  1,855  1,618  0.534  0.65  0.14 
1983  1,412  3,613  0.281  0.20  0.10 
1984  718  4,226  0.145  0.07  0.05 
1985  2,612  4,721  0.356  0.11  0.05 
1986  2,860  5,345  0.349  0.19  0.08 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using the COMPUSTAT  data base. 
a.  Ratio of total market value of debt to total market value of assets. 
b.  Ratio of interest expense  to operating income before depreciation,  taxes,  and interest expense.  Negative  values 
and values  greater than 100 are shown  as  +-. 
c.  Current assets  are defined as the sum of cash,  receivables,  inventories,  and other miscellaneous  items. 
the year-to-year  movements  of our  variable.  The main  results  suggested 
by table 13  are that, according  to this particular  solvency measure,  there 
has been little in the way of secular  deterioration  in the condition  of the 
typical  firm;  however, there  does appear  to have been sor e tendency  to 
decline recently, especially at the low end of the distribution. 
Corporate Financial Trends by Industry 
In this section we break our sample of COMPUSTAT  firms into 
industrial  groups, roughly SIC two-digit industries, with some of the 
smaller industries merged, as described in table 14. Industry-specific Ben S. Bernanke and John  Y. Campbell  113 
Table 13.  Altman's Z-Ratio, COMPUSTAT Firms,  1969-86a 
Number  of 
Full  firms in 
Year  sample  1  5  10  50  sample 
1969  3.34  0.81  1.06  1.37  3.99  641 
1970  3.29  0.81  1.12  1.33  3.64  693 
1971  3.52  0.79  1.16  1.36  3.93  745 
1972  3.78  0.73  1.15  1.36  3.95  795 
1973  3.60  0.61  1.04  1.24  3.40  857 
1974  3.09  0.59  0.87  1.11  3.21  900 
1975  3.06  0.61  1.03  1.25  3.38  927 
1976  3.30  0.82  1.16  1.42  3.84  961 
1977  3.16  0.88  1.27  1.48  3.71  1,004 
1978  3.10  0.91  1.20  1.46  3.70  1,044 
1979  3.16  0.88  1.17  1.51  3.93  1,077 
1980  3.28  0.90  1.18  1.60  4.01  1,114 
1981  3.03  0.86  1.18  1.54  3.85  i,156 
1982  3.01  0.77  1.16  1.48  3.81  1,183 
1983  3.30  0.66  1.18  1.52  4.14  1,245 
1984  3.22  0.39  1.18  1.49  3.88  1,307 
1985  3.22  0.07  1.06  1.48  3.71  1,365 
1986  3.15  -0.43  1.00  1.38  3.51  1,368 
Source:  Same as table 5. 
a.  The Z-ratio is defined in the text.  Higher values  imply greater solvency. 
data  enable  us to address  three  concerns  about  the results  in the  previous 
section. 
First, although  there  is no clear upward  trend  in aggregate  debt-asset 
measures, there could be strong trends in some industrial  groups. A 
concentration  of debt  in a few industries  would  justify concern  about  the 
possible effects of an adverse industry-specific  shock. 
Second, shifts in the industrial  composition of our COMPUSTAT 
sample could conceal increases in debt-asset ratios. If industries  with 
low debt-asset ratios have gained a larger weight in our sample over 
time, either by growth in the number  of firms for the equal-weighted 
distribution, or by growth in market value for the value-weighted 
distribution,  then  it is possible  in  principle  for  debt-asset  ratios  to increase 
in every industry,  but  for our aggregate  measures  to remain  constant.43 
Third,  we have not yet tried  to take into account  changes  over time in 
43.  Note,  however,  that in this situation our equal-weighted results for a fixed sample 
of firms would detect the increase. In fact those results are very similar to the ones reported 
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Table 14.  Debt-Asset Ratios, COMPUSTAT Firms, by Industry, 
Selected Periods, 1969-86a 
Industry  1969-74  1975-80  1981-86  1984  1985  1986 
Total 
Market-value weightb  0.273  0.334  0.313  0.312  0.304  0.313 
Fixed  1969-74 weightc  0.273  0.303  0.303  0.307  0.301  0.315 
Fixed  1986 weightd  0.298  0.322  0.308  0.309  0.302  0.313 
Market-value weight 
excluding  oile  0.295  0.360  0.308  0.299  0.290  0.309 
Laboratory equipment  0.098  0.188  0.220  0.251  0.230  0.239 
Printing and publishing  0.124  0.144  0.120  0.089  0.123  0.159 
Electronics  0.161  0.162  0.141  0.137  0.139  0.173 
Paper  0.170  0.221  0.238  0.262  0.255  0.276 
Chemicals  and pharmaceuticals  0.174  0.232  0.203  0.193  0.184  0.186 
Petroleum  and natural gas  0.194  0.163  0.338  0.357  0.364  0.464 
Petroleum  refining  0.211  0.258  0.323  0.349  0.348  0.314 
Miningf  0.225  0.312  0.364  0.391  0.348  0.364 
Food  and tobaccog  0.227  0.244  0.224  0.208  0.233  0.241 
Retailh  0.229  0.312  0.247  0.235  0.217  0.226 
Lumber and furniturei  0.246  0.241  0.271  0.263  0.279  0.294 
Machinery  0.254  0.264  0.282  0.288  0.268  0.306 
Glass and concrete  0.254  0.347  0.343  0.318  0.330  0.439 
Vehicles  0.266  0.280  0.264  0.211  0.223  0.286 
Apparel  0.283  0.323  0.229  0.279  0.173  0.229 
Metal products  0.303  0.282  0.264  0.277  0.308  0.321 
Rubber and plastics  0.318  0.414  0.281  0.257  0.228  0.273 
ConstructionJ  0.335  0.305  0.321  0.348  0.286  0.377 
Wholesalek  0.373  0.378  0.262  0.235  0.243  0.289 
Textiles  0.442  0.546  0.384  0.420  0.402  0.376 
Steel  refining  0.453  0.430  0.437  0.475  0.474  0.442 
Transportation'  0.475  0.517  0.432  0.407  0.404  0.466 
Utilities  0.501  0.527  0.493  0.489  0.488  0.484 
Communications  0.513  0.479  0.382  0.378  0.340  0.347 
Number  of firms in sample  883  1,096  1,346  1,283  1,346  1,346 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using the COMPUSTAT  data base. 
a.  The numbers in this table are value-weighted  mean debt-asset ratios, by industry and weighting across industries. 
b.  Weights  each  industry by  its current share  in total  market value.  (The  numbers  differ from those  in table 4 
because  some  small industries have been  excluded.) 
c.  Uses  fixed  1969-74 value weights. 
d.  Uses  fixed  1986 value weights. 
e.  Excludes  oil-related  industries,  SIC codes  13 and 29. 
f.  SIC codes  10, 12, and 14. 
g.  SIC codes  20 and 21. 
h.  SIC codes  52-59. 
i.  SIC codes  24 and 25. 
j.  SIC codes  15-17. 
k.  SIC codes  50 and 51. 
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the variables that determine debt-asset ratios. If variables that are 
historically  associated with high debt-asset ratios have been unusually 
low in recent years, then one would expect debt-asset ratios to fall. In 
this situation, constant debt-asset ratios might nevertheless indicate 
deteriorating  corporate  financial  conditions. 
In table 14 we present evidence that is relevant for the first two of 
these issues. We calculate  value-weighted  mean  debt-asset  ratios, using 
our growing sample of firms, for each industrial  group. From these 
ratios,  we compute  value-weighted  aggregate  measures  in several  differ- 
ent ways: using  own-year  value  weights;  using 1969-74  average  and 1986 
value weights to fix the industry  composition  of the sample;  and using 
own-year  value weights excluding oil-related  industries  (SIC codes 13 
and  29) that have behaved  unusually  in the 1980s. 
The  aggregate  measures  tell a fairly  consistent  story. Debt-asset  ratios 
have increased  in recent  years, but  even at the end of 1986  they were not 
extraordinarily  high relative to ratios during 1975-80. This holds true 
whether  we allow industrial  composition  to change  through  the sample 
by using own-year weights or fix the composition at 1969-74 or 1986 
values, and  whether  we include  or exclude the oil-related  industries.44 
The industry-specific  debt-asset ratios reveal striking changes in 
leverage  in a few industries.  The most dramatic  example  is the  petroleum 
and natural  gas industry (SIC 13), whose value-weighted  mean debt- 
asset ratio rose from an average of 0.194 in 1969-74 to an average of 
0.338 in 1981-86,  reaching  0.364 in 1985  and 0.464 in 1986.  Mining  (SIC 
10),  petroleum  refining  (SIC  29), paper  (SIC  26), glass and  concrete  (SIC 
32), and laboratory  equipment  (SIC 38) also had increasing  debt-asset 
ratios.  But  these were among  the less levered  industries  in 1969-74,  while 
the five most highly  levered industries  in that  period-textiles  (SIC 22), 
steel refining  (SIC 33), transportation  (SIC 40), utilities (SIC 49), and 
communications  (SIC 48)-all  experienced declining  debt-asset ratios 
from 1969-74  through  1986.  Thus the right  tail of the industry  debt-asset 
distribution  does not seem to have increased. 
Our  industry  data panel can also be used to estimate a simple model 
of the determinants  of debt-asset  ratios. In this way we can try to take 
account  of some of the forces that  may have encouraged  or discouraged 
corporate  debt issuance over the sample  period. 
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We estimate a familiar  partial-adjustment  model for debt issue. The 
dependent  variable  is an industry's  net issue of debt-the  change  in the 
book value of debt or, equivalently,  new issue less estimated  maturing 
debt  from  the BSW method. We have 
(1)  AJ~Dit  =  [MIt -  (Mit -  ADit)]  +  uit, 
where  ADit is the net issue of industry  i in year  t, A  is a partial  adjustment 
parameter,  M, is the target  market  value of debt for the end of year t, 
and Mit  is the actual market  value of debt at the end of year t. (Thus 
mit  -  ADat  is the market value of debt that the industry would have at 
the end of the year if it refinanced  maturing  debt but took no other 
action.)45 
In estimation  we scale the equation  by the end-of-year  market  value 
of assets, Ait,  both to reduce  heteroskedasticity  and  because it is natural 
to think  of the industry  as having  a target  ratio  M,8/Ait.46  We model the 
target  ratio  as a linear  function  of industry  dummies,  time  dummies,  and 
several variables that vary over both industries and time. The latter 
include OPINC, the ratio of after-tax  earnings  plus interest  paid to the 
market  value of assets; CASH, the ratio of cash and receivables to the 
market  value of assets; INVENT, the ratio  of inventories  to the market 
value of assets; PLANT, the ratio  of plant  and equipment  to the market 
value of assets; OTH, the ratio of other current  assets to the market 
value  of assets; GSALES,  the real  growth  rate  of industry  sales measured 
from  the previous  year  to the current  year;  and  SIGMA,  the log standard 
deviation of sales growth across firms  within the industry.47  The time 
dummies  are included  to allow for aggregate  movements in debt-asset 
ratios  that are not explainable  by the industry-specific  variables. 
We think  of OPINC  and GSALES  as measures  of corporate  liquidity 
that might  affect the ability  of firms  to issue new debt. On this interpre- 
tation we expect them to enter the equation with a positive sign. We 
note, however, that low values of OPINC and GSALES might also 
reflect  a temporary  cash-flow  deficit  that  would  cause firms  to issue more 
45.  We obtained similar results when we estimated a variant of this model that assumes 
that the industry controls the market value of its debt directly. The dependent variable in 
the alternative model is AMi,  and the right-hand-side variable is Mi  -  Mi.,-,. 
46.  We estimate the equation using our fixed sample of firms, rather than the growing 
sample used in table 13, because there are some sudden changes in industry market values 
in the growing sample as new firms enter the sample. 
47.  The various asset ratios are all value-weighted  measures that effectively  treat the 
industry as a single firm. SIGMA is a value-weighted  standard deviation. Ben S. Bernanke  and John Y. Canpbell  117 
debt to meet planned  dividend  payments  and investment  expenses.48  If 
this  effect is important,  OPINC  and  GSALES  might  enter  with  a negative 
sign. 
CASH, INVENT, PLANT, and OTH  are all variables  that measure 
the collateral  of an industry  relative  to the market  value of its assets. We 
expect that  industries  with high  collateral  (such as the utility  industry,  a 
traditional  high-leverage  industry)  are able to issue more  debt  relative  to 
market-value  assets. The sum of the collateral  variables  is the ratio of 
book assets to the market  value of assets-roughly,  the reciprocal  of 
Tobin's q. 
Finally, SIGMA  is included  as a rough  measure  of the riskiness  of an 
industry  at a particular  time, and therefore  of the expected bankruptcy 
costs associated with a given level of debt. We expect SIGMA  to enter 
the equation  with a negative  sign. 
The reduced-form  equation  we estimate, omitting  the constant, time, 
and  industry  dummies,  is 
(2)  ADit/Ait  =  -0.409MDEBT  +  0.042 OPINC  -  0.187 CASH 
(0.043)  (0.114)  (0.056) 
+ 0.183INVENT+  0.222PLANT+  0.2040TH 
(0.053)  (0.034)  (0.068) 
+  0.0  17  GSALES  +  0.002 SIGMA  +  lit, 
(0.035)  (0.003) 
where MDEBT is the market value of debt (standard  errors are in 
parentheses).The  estimate  of the partial  adjustment  parameter  A, - 0.409, 
is quite plausible  and has a low standard  error. Of the other variables, 
we find that high ratios of inventory, plant and equipment, and other 
book assets to the market  value of assets tend to raise the desired level 
of the market  debt-asset  ratio.  A high  ratio  of cash to market  assets tends 
to lower debt issue, other things  equal. The other variables  do not have 
a strong  effect on debt issue. 
One interesting  feature  of the results is the pattern  of estimated  time 
effects. The sums  of the time dummy  coefficients  over the periods 1970- 
74, 1975-80,  and 1981-86  are 0.2 10, - 0.101, and - 0.109, respectively. 
(The  coefficients  are normalized  in such a way that  they average  to zero 
48.  Alan  Auerbach,  "Real  Determinants  of  Corporate  Leverage,"  in  Friedman, 
Corporate Capital Structure, pp. 301-22,  includes a variable of this sort. 118  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1988 
over the entire sample period.) In 1984, 1985, and 1986  the estimated 
time dummies  are -0.026,  -0.011,  and 0.028. These estimates imply 
that the growth in debt over the 1980s as a whole, including  the high 
levels of repurchases  in 1984  and 1985, is well explained by the other 
variables in the equation and has not been unusual in that sense. 
However,  debt  did  grow  unusually  rapidly  in 1986.  The  estimated  positive 
coefficients  on INVENT,  PLANT,  and OTH may also contribute  to the 
high 1986  dummy,  since the increase  in stock market  values in 1984  and 
1985 lowered these variables in 1986 and would normally  have been 
expected to lower debt issue relative to the market  value of assets. To 
this extent there may be some truth to the view that constant market 
debt-asset ratios, in a period of rapidly  rising stock market  prices, are 
historically  unusual  and suggest deteriorating  corporate  financial  con- 
ditions. 
Effects of the Market Crash 
The final  item on our agenda  is to evaluate the effect of unfavorable 
macroeconomic  developments on corporate financial  conditions. We 
begin by studying  the effect of the October 1987  stock market  crash on 
the market-value  debt-asset ratios of firms  in our sample. Our  focus is 
not  on debt-asset  ratios  during  the crash  itself, but  rather  on the corporate 
debt situation  in the aftermath  of the decline, at the end of 1987. 
As a first  approximation,  one might  expect to find  only a small  effect 
of the events of 1987 on market-value  debt-asset ratios. Most broad 
common  stock indexes were only slightly  lower at the end of 1987  than 
at  the end  of 1986,  because  the October  crash  was preceded  by a dramatic 
increase in stock prices. It is possible, however, that the distribution  of 
market-value  debt-asset ratios moved adversely in 1987. In particular, 
if the stock prices of more highly levered industries, or more highly 
levered firms  within  each industry,  fell more  than  those of others during 
the year, then the right tail of the debt-asset distribution  could have 
shifted  out. 
Because our COMPUSTAT  data end in 1986,  we can construct  only 
rather  crude estimates of end-1987  debt-asset  ratios. We collected data 
from  the Wall  Street  Journal  on end-1987  common  stock prices  for 1,230 
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Table 15.  Debt-Asset Ratios after the Stock Market Crash of 1987, 
COMPUSTAT Firms" 
Full  Percentiles 
Year  and change  sample  50  90  95  99 
1986  0.295  0.328  0.612  0.709  0.797 
1987  0.348  0.386  0.729  0.808  0.925 
Absolute  change  0.053  0.058  0.117  0.099  0.128 
Percentage  change  18.0  17.7  19.1  14.0  16.1 
Sour-ce: Authors  calculations  using the COMPuJSTAT data base and end-of-the-year  equity  prices from the Wall 
Street Jourtnal. 
a.  In this table the sample consists  of  1,230 firms for which  we were able to obtain equity  prices as of the end of 
1987. 
prices and measures of the market value of debt based on end-1987 
interest  rates  and end-1986  book values of debt. 
In table 15 we report debt-asset ratios for our 1,230 firms, both in 
aggregate,  as we did in table 4, and by percentile  of the distribution  of 
debt-asset ratios, as we did in table 5. The aggregate  value-weighted 
mean  debt-asset  ratio  increased  from  0.295 at the end of 1986  to 0.348 at 
the end of 1987, a rise of 0.053. This is a noticeable increase, although 
the end-1987  value is still comparable  to or below the levels reached  by 
the value-weighted  mean of our varying  sample in several years in the 
seventies (1974, 1977, and 1978).  There is also some evidence of a tail 
effect in the absolute  changes;  the median  debt-asset  ratio  rose 0.058, or 
17.7 percent, and the higher percentiles of the distribution  rose even 
more. The higher  percentiles  at the end of 1987  seem to be comparable 
to those reached at the previous peak in 1974. These numbers are 
particularly  striking  because they ignore any net debt issue that may 
have occurred  in 1987. 
RISKS  FROM  RECESSION 
A prime  concern  of those who have called attention  to the dangers  of 
corporate  leverage  is that  U.S. corporations  are now more  vulnerable  to 
a recession than they were in earlier  decades.49  Debt-asset ratios were 
lower in 1986 than in 1974, but the latter was a recession year; if a 
49. Friedman,  "Increasing  Indebtedness  and  Financial  Stability  in the  United  States"; 
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recession hit today the ratios  might  well rise beyond their  previous  peak 
levels. 
To get a sense of the potential effects of a recession on corporate 
financial  structure,  we simulated  the effects of recessions like those of 
1973-74  and 1981-82. For each firm  that existed in the base year, 1972 
or 1980,  we computed  the percentage  changes in the total market  value 
of the firm  that were actually  observed over the two succeeding years, 
which  we call recession year 1 and  recession year  2.50  We also computed 
the changes  in the book value of the firm's  debt and applied  these same 
changes,  scaled  up  by the book  value  of the firm's  assets, to the corporate 
financial conditions of  1986. Using the BSW method and historical 
changes in interest rates from the appropriate  recession, we were able 
to calculate market-value  debt-asset ratios for each firm  in two hypo- 
thetical years following 1986  on the assumption  that changes from the 
earlier  recession experience were duplicated.  In a parallel  way we also 
calculated the ratios of interest expense to cash flow and to current 
assets for each firm.51  The simulation  results are reported  in table 16  for 
both the 1973-74  recession and the 1981-82  recession. 
The most dramatic  deterioration  in debt-asset ratios occurs in the 
simulation  of the 1973-74 recession. During 1973-74 the total market 
value of COMPUSTAT  firms  dropped  sharply. In 1986  these firms  are 
more highly  leveraged, so their debt-asset  ratios are high to begin with 
and are more severely affected  by a given drop  in total market  value. A 
repetition of  the  1973-74 fall in total market value would lead to 
unprecedented  debt-asset  ratios. In fact, for at least 10  percent  of firms 
the simulated  debt-asset  ratios  exceed unity, indicating  bankruptcy.  The 
median  debt-asset  ratio  reaches  0.616 as compared  with a previous  peak 
of 0.532.2  The ratios of interest expense to cash flow and to current 
assets do not change  as dramatically. 
In the 1981-82  recession, by contrast,  the stock market  was relatively 
stable and interest  rates were high, reducing  the market  value of debt. 
50.  The 1986 starting statistics  differ for the two simulations because the firms in the 
1972 and 1980 samples differ. 
51.  We  took  observed  changes  in earnings  and  current assets  from  the  historical 
recessions  and scaled  them up by the  book  value  of the  firm's assets.  We used  BSW 
measures of interest expenses. 
52.  The full-sample debt-asset  ratio reaches 0.962,  but this number should be treated 
with caution since it is greatly affected by the firms with ratios greater than unity. This is 
also why the full-sample ratios often differ substantially from the 50th percentile values. 122  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
The results  in the table  reflect  this fact; the full-sample  and  median  debt- 
asset ratios  do not change  much, although  there  is some deterioration  in 
the higher  percentiles  of the distribution.  Since earnings  fall and  interest 
rates rise in the simulation,  however, the ratios of interest expense to 
cash flow and  to current  assets deteriorate  sharply,  particularly  for firms 
above the median. 
Conclusion: How High Is High? 
Recent concern about excessive corporate  debt appears  to be based 
on high growth rates of aggregate  corporate debt, measured at book 
value, relative to the growth rates of sales and gross income. In this 
paper  we have measured  corporate  debt relative  to the corporate  assets 
available to support it, using estimates of market values of debt and 
assets to supplement  book values. In our  sample  of COMPUSTAT  firms, 
we find  little evidence of an upward  trend  in corporate  debt-asset  ratios, 
whether they are measured  at book values or at market  values. Debt- 
asset ratios  did rise in 1986,  but even at the end of 1986  were well below 
the high  levels reached  in 1974-75. 
We have also studied the cross-sectional distribution  of debt-asset 
ratios by firm  and by industry.  The 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles of 
the distribution  of debt-asset  ratios  do not seem to have increased  faster 
than the median ratio in the eighties; thus there has been no clear 
tendency for the upper tail of the debt-asset distribution  to increase. 
There are some striking  changes in the relative leverage of different 
industries, but there has been no tendency for debt-asset ratios to 
increase in traditionally  high-leverage  industries. All in all, corporate 
financial conditions, as reflected in this measure of solvency, seem 
relatively  stable  in recent years. 
By contrast,  we find  deterioration  during  the  eighties  in  some  measures 
of corporate  liquidity,  such as the ratios  of interest  expense to cash flow 
and current  assets. The solvency and liquidity  measures  diverge in the 
eighties  because of the substantial  rise in corporate  price-earnings  ratios 
that  increases  our measure  of assets in debt-asset  ratios. 
For several reasons, we choose to emphasize  the signs of corporate 
financial  stress over the measures  that suggest that corporate  financial 
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comparison  of a normal  year with a recession year. If a recession were 
to occur  today, particularly  if it were accompanied  by a substantial  drop 
in the stock market,  debt-asset  ratios measured  at market  value would 
rise dramatically.  We find  some evidence that  the upper  tail of the debt- 
asset distribution  has increased in the aftermath  of the stock market 
crash  of 1987;  and  when we simulate  a recession like that  of 1973-74,  we 
find  that debt-asset ratios rise to unprecedented  levels, implying  bank- 
ruptcy for more than 10 percent of our sample of firms. Second, in a 
recession or financial crisis, corporate liquidity may become more 
important;  a solvent but illiquid  corporation  may be forced into bank- 
ruptcy  if it is temporarily  unable  to roll over its debt. 
A caveat applies  to all the results  we have reported.  Although  we can 
measure trends in aggregate financial  ratios, in the end we have no 
reliable  metric of whether these ratios are in some absolute sense too 
high  or too low. The natural  tendency  is to try to make  judgments  about 
the aggregate  ratios based on analogies  with the historical  experiences 
of individual  firms, as we did when we compared 1969-86 aggregate 
financial  ratios  with  those of Chrysler  Corporation.  Using  the experience 
of individual  firms to interpret  changes in aggregate financial  ratios, 
however, may be fallacious. While  the deterioration  of a firm's  financial 
ratios relative to prevailing  norms is probably  bad news for the firm, 
changes in the norms themselves may reflect only changes in the 
regulatory  and  financial  environment. 
The effect of a change in norms on aggregate  riskiness depends on 
why the norms  changed,  which  may  be hard  to ascertain.  The distinction 
between changes in the condition of an individual  firm  and changes in 
norms  is most striking  in international  comparisons.  Debt-asset  ratios  of 
Japanese corporations, for example, are twice those of  their U.S. 
counterparts;  the difference  is due to institutional  arrangements,  such 
as the particular  structure  of the Japanese  banking  system, and  does not 
imply  that  Japanese  firms  on average  are riskier."3 
On the other hand, if one wants to make the case that norms have 
changed,  so that  acceptable  levels of corporate  risk  can be achieved  with 
greater interest burdens than before, it is important  to pinpoint the 
changes  in financial  market  conditions  or practices  that  are supposed  to 
53.  Albert Ando and Alan Auerbach,  "The Cost of Capital in the U.S.  and Japan: A 
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have brought  about  the change. Two suggestions  have been made  to us: 
the emergence of  the junk bond market and of  corporate pension 
overfunding.54 
The junk bond argument  is that these bonds represent a financial 
innovation  that allows firms  to issue more debt without  increasing  risk. 
This might be true, for example, if junk bonds were held primarily  by 
insiders who could be counted on to renegotiate rather than force 
bankruptcy. Junk bonds would then be like equity, only relabeled, 
presumably  for tax purposes. 
However, there is little evidence that the emergence of junk bonds 
has changed  the meaning  of standard  financial  ratios.55  First,  junk bonds 
make  up only a small  part  of total corporate  debt; although  constituting 
about 20 percent of corporate  bonds outstanding  in 1986,  junk bonds 
account for well under 10 percent of  nonfinancial  corporate debt, 
including  bank loans and short-term  debt.56  Second, junk bond issues 
have increased  largely  at the expense of bank  loans to corporations.  As 
such, they are part of the general trend toward "securitization" of 
traditionally  intermediated  instruments.  Because  junk bonds tend to be 
held by mutual  funds, insurance  companies, and other institutions, it 
seems likely that their  expanded  use has increased  rather  than  reduced 
the difficulty  of avoiding bankruptcy  through  negotiation. Finally, far 
from  being  an innovation,  low-grade  bonds  were used extensively in the 
1920s. 
The pension fund argument  is that high levels of overfunding  may 
have given corporations  the flexibility needed to take on more debt 
safely. This may  have been true  as late as 1984,  but  in more  recent years 
falling  interest  rates  have  increased  the  present  value  of pension  liabilities 
and eliminated  this surplus.57  Thus changes in net pension obligations, 
which are not included in our measures of  debt, probably do not 
rationalize  higher  interest  burdens. 
54.  By Lawrence Summers and Sanford Grossman, respectively. 
55.  This paragraph relies heavily on Kevin Perry and Robert Taggart, "The Growing 
Role of Junk Bonds in Corporate Finance,"  ContinentalBank Journal ofApplied Corporate 
Finance  (forthcoming). 
56.  Junk bonds outstanding were $125 billion at the end of 1986; according to the Flow 
of Funds Accounts,  credit market instruments of nonfinancial corporations  at that time 
amounted to $1,711 billion. Also,  about one-third of the junk bonds were "fallen angels," 
bonds issued at investment grade that were subsequently  downgraded. 
57.  Chuck Paustian, "$200 Billion Surplus Wiped Out," Pension and InvestnmentAge, 
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We conclude that although  it is important  to consider the possibility 
that  norms  in corporate  finance  have changed,  we have no good account 
of why they may have done so. In the absence of strong  evidence for a 
change in norms, it  seems appropriate  to  be concerned about the 
historically  unusual trends in corporate finance during  the 1980s. In 
particular,  the continued  financial  health  of the corporate  sector seems 
to require  that the strong  earnings  growth  forecast by the stock market 
actually take place. Should this earnings growth fail to materialize, 
measures  of corporate  financial  stress  could  reach  unprecedented  levels. Comments 
and Discussion 
Benjamin M. Friedman:  Ben Bernanke  and John Campbell  conclude 
that "it seems appropriate  to be concerned"  about  the current  corporate 
debt situation  in the United States, and I agree. While we do not yet 
have the corporate  debt "crisis" about which they ask in their title, I 
believe-even  more so  than they-that  we  have a corporate debt 
problem,  and  a potentially  serious one at that. The heart  of the problem 
is the increased financial  fragility that has resulted from the massive 
borrowing  campaign  upon which American  business corporations  have 
embarked  since the current  economic expansion  began  in 1983.  A major 
strength  of the Bernanke-Campbell  paper is its focus, which I would 
have liked to be still sharper,  on the fact that "the continued  financial 
health  of the corporate  sector seems to require  that the strong  earnings 
growth  forecast  by the stock market  actually  take place.'" 
Although popular discussion of debt problems has devoted more 
attention  to consumer  debt, exploiting  the myth  of the "me generation" 
to highlight,  and  often  exaggerate,  how much  individuals  have  borrowed, 
Bernanke  and Campbell  are right in looking instead at business debt. 
While  both households  and  businesses have borrowed  in record  volume 
during  the 1980s,  on the whole they have done so for different  purposes. 
Households have built up record debt levels relative to their incomes, 
but  at the same  time they have built  up record  asset levels, including  not 
just equities and other assets exhibiting  high price volatility, but also 
liquid assets  and other stable-price debt instruments. As  a result, 
aggregate  household net worth compared  with gross national  product 
has shown no deterioration  since 1980, and that remains  true after the 
October 19 stock market  collapse. By contrast, as the "supply-side" 
promises and premises that motivated  this decade's economic policies 
have crumbled  into dust, business investment in the 1980s has been 
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weaker than in any sustained  period since World  War  II. Increasingly 
during  the 1980s,  American  business corporations  have borrowed  not to 
invest, in either  tangible  or financial  assets, but simply  to pay down their 
own or other corporations'  equity. As a result, the corporate  sector's 
aggregate net worth has declined not just in comparison with gross 
national  product,  but absolutely.1 
Even so, as Bernanke  and Campbell  rightly  point out, the potential 
problem  lies not with  business solvency but  with  business liquidity.  The 
deterioration  in the corporate  sector's interest  coverage  is striking.  Since 
1980  it has consistently taken more than 50 cents of every dollar  of the 
average  nonfarm  nonfinancial  corporation's  pretax  earnings  just to pay 
its interest  bill. That  is a far cry from  the 1950s  and 1960s,  when interest 
payments took just 16 cents of each dollar of earnings  on average, or 
even the 1970s, when interest payments took 33 cents on average. 
Moreover,  instead  of improving,  as the continuing  economic expansion 
boosted earnings  and as interest rates declined, corporations'  interest 
coverage  eroded  further  in  both 1985  and 1986.  Bernanke  and  Campbell's 
table 6 relates interest expense to cash flow rather  than  just earnings, 
but  the  increase  in the 1980s  is still  apparent.  If the  highly  useful  percentile 
breakdowns  that Bernanke  and Campbell  present for their sample of 
corporations  are indicative of the distribution  for the universe of all 
nonfinancial  corporations,  they suggest very narrow  interest coverage 
indeed  for many  firms.2  It is not surprising,  therefore,  that  the economic 
expansion  that began in 1983  has been the only expansion since World 
War II to bring with it a rising, rather than falling, rate of business 
bankruptcies  and debt defaults. 
1. As of year-end 1980, the net worth of the U.S. nonfarm  nonfinancial  corporate 
business  sector, as calculated  in the Federal  Reserve System's Flow of Funds  Accounts 
(that  is, with liabilities  and  debt assets valued  at par,  reproducible  tangible  assets valued 
at reproduction  cost, the land  valued  at market)  was 91.4 percent  of fourth-quarter  1980 
GNP. By year-end  1986  the comparable  ratio  was 76.3 percent. 
2. Bernanke  and Campbell's  sample  apparently  includes  primarily  mature  firms  that 
pay more  dividends,  and rely less on borrowing,  than  the average  nonfarm  nonfinancial 
business corporation.  Firms in the sample  also account for a disproportionately  small 
share  of corporate  equity  repurchases.  For 1986,  for example,  table  2 reports  $38.1  billion 
of dividend  payments,  which compares  with $95.7 billion  for the nonfarm  nonfinancial 
business  sector  as a whole (from  the Flow of Funds  Accounts).  By contrast,  in 1986  firms 
in the sample  raised  just $39.6  billion  from  net debt  issues, as against  $190.2  billion  for the 
sector  overall,  and  repurchased  only $7.3 billion  of equity, as against  $76.5  billion  for the 
sector  overall. 128  Brookings Papers  on Econoinic  Activity,  1:1988 
The typical answer to all this is-or,  at least until October 19, was- 
that debt levels and interest burdens  are high compared  with today's 
earnings  but not in relation to the earnings  that American  business is 
likely to enjoy in the not-very-distant  future: that our economy has 
entered  a new era of stability  and rapid  growth,  which soon enough  will 
deliver the higher earnings needed to service the debts of all but the 
usual small percentage  of corporations  that are obviously mismanaged 
or  extraordinarily  unfortunate.  For  observers  naturally  inclined  to accept 
as optimal  whatever debt levels corporate  managers  have taken on, as 
long as the reorganizations  and  recapitalizations  that  gave rise to all this 
borrowing  resulted  from private  responses to profit-maximizing  incen- 
tives, the evidence for this optimistic view was high and rising stock 
prices-which,  according  to this view, merely discount  future  earnings 
in the most efficient way imaginable,  and therefore provide the best 
available  estimate  of what  those future  earnings  will be. 
The crash has changed all that. Figure 1 plots the ratio of debt (at 
book value) to equity (at market  value) for the nonfarm  nonfinancial 
corporate  business sector.3  The solid line through  1986  indicates year- 
end values of the debt-equity  ratio calculated  directly  from the Flow of 
Funds Accounts. I have also added several points for 1987, including 
the August 25 stock market  peak as well as October 19, based on an 
interpolation  of the quarterly  Flow of Funds corporate  borrowing  data 
for 1987,  in conjunction  with a simple  equation  I estimated  to relate  the 
Standard  and Poor's stock price index (published  daily) to the Flow of 
Funds estimate of the market value of equity for the entire nonfarm 
nonfinancial  corporate  business sector.4  I have also added  in the figure 
a value of  the debt-equity ratio for March 31,  1988, based on an 
extrapolation  of the pace of corporate  borrowing  during  the latter  half  of 
last year, and closing stock prices for March  31. 
The resulting data speak for themselves, and I will not dwell on 
3. I believe  that  the  book-to-market  correction  for  debt  is less important  than  Bernanke 
and  Campbell,  and  many  others,  suggest.  One  reason  is the callability,  typically  after  some 
deferment  period,  of most of the corporate  debt that does not bear  an explicitly  floating 
interest  rate anyway. Another  reason is that interest  levels today are not far from the 
relevant  mean  for  evaluating  the  fixed-rate  corporate  debt  now  outstanding.  Some  empirical 
evidence  also suggests  that,  at least in the aggregate,  fluctuations  in market  values  relative 
to par values have not changed  the total of corporate  debt outstanding  much compared 
with  the questions  at issue here. 
4. The simple  correlation  between  these two variables  is 0.98. Ben S. Bernanke and John  Y. Campbell  129 
Figure 1.  Debt-Equity Ratio, U.S.  Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 
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whether  this particular  glass is half full or half empty. Either way, the 
central  point bearing  on the questions at issue in Bernanke  and Camp- 
bell's paper  is that the principal  empirical  foundation  for the optimism 
about corporations'  debt burdens in relation to likely future earnings, 
which was often expressed  just a short  time ago, has now disappeared. 
That all this has happened during  a period of sustained economic 
expansion is itself interesting  enough. But as Bernanke  and Campbell 
appropriately  recognize, the real question is what would happen if, at 
some time in the near future, we should experience a recession of any 
significant  severity.  The  simulations  that  Bernanke  and  Campbell  present 
in table 16 address this question directly, and the results are hardly 
reassuring.  I take these results to be highly supportive  of just the fears 
that those of us who have expressed concern about the corporate  debt 
problem  have had in mind. In the event of a significant  recession-like 
that  of 1973-75  or 1981-82-an  unusually  large  number  of corporations 
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otherwise sound may therefore  find themselves threatened  on account 
of the failure  of their customers  and their suppliers.  This is exactly the 
"automatic destabilizer" problem to which Bernanke and Campbell 
refer. 
Nonetheless, for  reasons  I have  elaborated  elsewhere, I do not believe 
that the most likely result of corporate  America's post-1982  borrowing 
binge  is a cumulative  series  of defaults  leading  to debt  deflation  or  worse  .5 
Instead, the more likely outcome is inflation.  It is of limited value to 
contemplate  such issues in the context of hypothetically  holding  mone- 
tary policy fixed, and it is clear that ranking  Federal Reserve officials 
are as aware of the problem  at issue here as anyone else. Forceful and 
sincere protestations  of commitment  to the anti-inflationary  cause not- 
withstanding,  it is highly  unlikely  that with today's debt burdens-and 
the default  risks  they entail  should  earnings  shrink-the Federal  Reserve 
would tolerate  a recession comparable  to that  of 1973-75  or 1981-82. 
To put the point in simple shorthand,  the borrowing  that American 
corporations  have done in the 1980s  has shifted  the short-  and interme- 
diate-run  trade-offs  confronting  monetary  policy, and it is implausible 
to expect policymakers  to respond  to events as they would  have had  that 
shift  not occurred.  But if the reason  these enlarged  debt  burdens  will not 
lead to debt deflation  or worse is that they have effectively locked the 
Federal Reserve into a no-recession monetary policy, the record of 
inflation  and business cycles since World  War  II gives little reason for 
confidence  that  the ultimate  consequence of the corporate  debt  problem 
will not be the return  of high  inflation. 
Lawrence H. Summers:  Ben Bernanke  and John Campbell  examine 
the question  of whether  the American  economy has an incipient  corpo- 
rate debt crisis. It is a rare  macroeconomist  who has not railed  against 
the twin budget  and trade  deficits  of recent years and the huge accumu- 
lation  of American  debt to foreigners.  Bernanke  and Campbell  focus on 
a different  and less clear-cut  issue-whether  growth  in the outstanding 
stock of corporate  debt constitutes a threat  to financial  stability.  Their 
primary  contribution  is a thorough evaluation of evidence from the 
COMPUSTAT  tapes on changes  in the extent of leverage  as reflected  in 
5. Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "Increasing  Indebtedness  and Financial  Stability  in the 
United  States," in Federal  Reserve Bank  of Kansas  City, Debt, Financial  Stability,  and 
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ratios  of corporate  debt  and  interest  payments  to various  denominators. 
Their conclusion is  one  of  cautious concern. They point out that 
substantial  costs are imposed by the excessive use of debt contracts, 
and they describe  several plausible  scenarios  that  could lead to unprec- 
edentedly  high  levels of financial  strain. 
I have three observations, which I will first state briefly  and then in 
more  detail. First, there  is less cause for concern  about  a corporate  debt 
crisis than Bernanke  and Campbell  suggest. Economic problems  are of 
different  types. The  productivity  slowdown  is profoundly  important,  but 
there are limits to what we  can do about it.  Promoting  tourism is 
something  we know how to do, but  there  is not much  advantage  to doing 
it. Corporate  debt is to national  economic policy about what disputes 
with Norway over fishing rights are to foreign policy. There is no 
apparent  way to solve the problem,  but it is not a very important  one. 
Second, if one wanted to worry about financial crises, there are 
grounds  for concern much more serious than those suggested by Ber- 
nanke and Campbell.  The dramatic  increase in stock market  volatility 
over the past several years provides  the most serious basis for concern 
about  the financial  health  of large  corporations.  But almost certainly  of 
greater  concern  than  the health  of large  industrial  corporations  like those 
on the COMPUSTAT  tape is the health  of small  businesses, businesses 
that  have recently  gone private,  and  those involved in real  estate. 
Third,  policymakers  concerned  about  debt buildups  could undertake 
reforms  that would succeed in reducing  corporate  leverage, but those 
same reforms  would probably  raise the cost of capital  facing American 
firms. 
Bernanke  and Campbell  begin with a theoretical discussion of the 
reason  why  firms  make  use of debt  contracts,  emphasizing  considerations 
of moral  hazard  and costly monitoring.  They stress the possible ineffi- 
ciencies of debt contracts in bankruptcy  situations, and acknowledge 
only briefly the arguments of a long line of agency theorists, most 
recently Michael Jensen, that debt contracts are beneficial  in limiting 
managerial  discretion.  I  Managers  endowed  with  free cash  flow are  prone 
to expand companies, often inappropriately.  Debt contracts subject 
management  to the frequent  discipline  of the capital  market. 
1.  Michael  C.  Jensen,  "Takeovers:  Their Causes  and Consequences,"  Journal  of 
Economic Perspectives,  vol. 2 (Winter 1988), pp. 21-48. 132  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  1:1988 
If one asks managers  of profitable,  prospering  companies with debt 
equity ratios in the 0.3 range  why they do not substitute  some debt for 
equity, they virtually  never refer to the possibility of future financial 
strain.  Instead,  they emphasize "loss of freedom," added  scrutiny,  and 
interference  with managerial  control as their reason for not taking on 
more debt. 
The evidence is more than anecdotal;  numerous  studies suggest that 
most firms could significantly increase their total market value by 
substituting  debt for equity.2 Event studies consistently reveal that 
companies  that  tie up  cash  flow  by issuing  debt  show significant  increases 
in total market  value despite the moral  hazard  problems  they risk. By 
contrast, companies that retire debt, or that issue equity, lose value. 
And, as is well known, investments  financed  from  retentions  are among 
the least profitable  that  firms  make. 
It may well be that  what is fat from the point of view of shareholders 
generates  important  externalities  for the economy. Bell Labs may be a 
good example here. And it may well be that bankruptcies  have social 
consequences, so that  private  sector agents  will run  excessive risks. But 
these are  not  judgments  that  can  be made  on a priori  grounds.  The crucial 
point  is that  theoretical  arguments  conflict  as to whether  the free market 
will generate  too much  or too little debt. 
Bernanke  and  Campbell  also make  much  of the indexed-debt  mystery. 
I have never found it so puzzling. We know that unanticipated  inflation 
is terrible  for  firms.  They  lose something  like 3 percent  of value  for every 
point of unanticipated  inflation.3  It is hardly  surprising  to me that they 
do not exacerbate this uncertainty  by offering bonds whose coupons 
would rise when inflation  increased. 
In trying to decide whether the United States has a corporate  debt 
problem, Bernanke and Campbell focus on trends in debt ratios of 
various kinds. An analogy makes clear the logical insufficiency  of this 
approach. Imagine that one observed that the average car was being 
driven faster in  1970 than in  1950, 1960, or  1965. Would such an 
2.  Michael  C.  Jensen,  "Agency  Costs  of  Free  Cash-flow,  Corporate  Finance  and 
Takeovers,"  American Economic  Review,  vol. 76 (May 1986, Papers  and Proceedings, 
1985), pp. 323-29. 
3.  For a discussion  of inflation's  impact on the valuation of corporate equities,  see 
Lawrence  H.  Summers,  "Inflation and the Valuation of Corporate Equities,"  Working 
Paper 824 (National Bureau of Economic  Research,  December  1981). Ben S. Bernanke and John  Y. Campbell  133 
observation  imply  that more risks were being taken on the highway?  If 
speed limits had been raised or drivers had become more headstrong, 
the risks could be up. But drivers  might  be driving  faster because roads 
were  better  or  because  better  cars  permitted  more  control  at high  speeds, 
in which case safety would have increased. Simply looking at speed 
without understanding  the reason speed increased would be uninfor- 
mative. 
In just the same way, analysis of increases in debt ratios without 
analysis of why the increase took place is not very helpful. Three 
hypotheses about increasing  debt present themselves. One, argued  by 
Roger Gordon among many others, suggests that rising interest rates 
caused by high inflation  during  the late 1970s  and early 1980s  increased 
the tax advantage  to corporate  debt, because debt is deducted  at a high 
rate whereas it is taxed at a lower rate.4  This plausible theory would 
suggest that increased corporate debt is a cause for concern, just as 
increases in speed caused by reduced speeding  enforcement  would be. 
The theory is less strong  on the dramatic  substitution  of debt for equity 
that  has taken  place in recent years. 
An alternative hypothesis attributes the increase in debt to  the 
development of the junk bond market  and associated innovations. In 
this case, it is far  from  clear  that  debt  is a source  of concern.  Innovations 
in  institutional  form  may  have  made  it possible  for  corporations  to exploit 
the tax system more  fully without  incurring  more  contracting  problems. 
Bernanke  and Campbell  correctly  observe that only a small part  of the 
increase  in corporate  debt can be traced  to junk bonds. But this misses 
the point. The knowledge  that  firms  in trouble  now have access to credit 
markets  will lead many firms  to operate with more leverage than they 
once did. 
The point  may be argued  in another  way. Contracting  problems,  after 
all, inhere  in structures,  not labels. If the tax law permitted  it, corpora- 
tions would  relabel  all of their  equity  as "junior  debt with income  linked 
coupons" and deduct all dividends. This would raise debt ratios, but 
have no effect on stability or efficiency. Some part of the observed 
increase  in debt must represent  less dramatic  innovations  of this sort. I 
4.  Roger H.  Gordon  and Burton G.  Malkiel,  "Corporation  Finance,"  in Henry  J. 
Aaron and Joseph A. Pechman, eds.,  How Taxes Affect Economnic  Behavior (Brookings, 
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think, for example, of leveraged buyouts where some investors hold 
both debt and  equity in the firm. 
A third  hypothesis about debt buildup  is that corporate  debt ratios 
have risen because people have come to the correct  view that the world 
is not as risky as they might  previously  have thought.  As Bernanke  and 
Campbell  note, we have never had a corporate debt crisis. What is 
remarkable  about the past six years is that despite the worst recession 
in fifty years, real interest  rates that  were once inconceivable,  and huge 
structural  changes, there have been no major  corporate  bankruptcies. 
Apologists for Latin American  and farm debtors have made much of 
how bailouts are appropriate  because what has happened  to them was 
so unexpected. I think they are probably  right to stress the surprising 
nature of recent events. Perhaps  corporate  managers  and their bond- 
holders have come to realize in the wake of the 1982  experience that 
corporations  can hold more  debt than  one might  initially  have expected 
without  facing  critical  liquidity  or solvency problems. 
I am agnostic  about  the relative  importance  of these explanations  for 
increased corporate  indebtedness. But without some serious effort to 
distinguish  between them, an effort  the paper  does not make, the simple 
observation that debt ratios have risen does not justify concern over 
corporate  debt problems. 
If I wanted to fret about financial stability, I would worry about 
sectors other than those reflected in Bernanke and Campbell's data. 
Large corporations  are a lightly levered sector of the economy. More 
problematic  are the thrift  institutions  that are far under water and the 
money center banks  that have a substantial  fraction  of their capital  still 
tied up in problematic  sovereign  loans, and more of their  capital  tied up 
in leveraged  buyout  financing  and  in real estate and  energy  loans. Other 
examples are real estate developers who need the proceeds from past 
sales to be able to undertake  new construction.  Still others are the farm 
and energy-producing  areas  of the country. 
It would be foolish to judge that it is inconceivable that monetary 
policy would ever turn so austere as to cause significant  corporate 
bankruptcies.  But so many other sectors of the economy are so much 
more fragile than the major nonfinancial  corporate sector that it is 
unlikely that we would ever see  a wave of corporate bankruptcies 
without  first  seeing  a cataclysm  in  these other  sectors. If such  a cataclysm 
came, corporate  bankruptcies  would be more a symptom  than a cause 
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In fact, the way monetary  policy is practiced  makes it very unlikely 
that  we will ever see a major  wave of corporate  bankruptcies.  Monetary 
shocks in the United States do not  just happen.  Contractionary  policies 
are  sometimes  pursued  to reduce  inflation.  If, as Bernanke  and  Campbell 
argue,  future  monetary  policy shocks will have greater  effects than  past 
ones, because they could trigger  more bankruptcies,  then the Federal 
Reserve will probably  release the brakes  more quickly  than  it has in the 
past, especially if it is concerned  about  the vulnerable  areas I have  just 
cited as well as about  corporate  bankruptcies. 
I do, however, wish to record one source of concern about the 
corporate sector. Financial  economics teaches us that equity may be 
thought of as an option on corporate  cash flows. The value of equity 
should thus depend critically on the volatility of the underlying  cash 
flows. Evidence on this is available-volatility is way up at least since 
October 19. I was sorry that Bernanke  and Campbell  did not make use 
of the readily  available  information  on volatility  measures  in evaluating 
evidence on debt-equity  ratios. 
Those who are concerned about the problem of excess corporate 
leverage  are  rarely  explicit  about  what  they would  do about  it. Bernanke 
and Campbell  do not really discuss this issue at all. Perhaps  the most 
common suggestion is that tax policies need to be designed to reduce 
leverage. 
This is a complex issue, as illustrated  by the question  of whether  the 
1986  tax reform  act increased or decreased corporations'  incentive to 
use debt finance.  There are two views. The "public  finance" view that 
dominated  much  of the political  discussion during  the tax reform  debate 
holds that by reducing the corporate rate, the 1986 tax act reduced 
incentives for leverage. The "corporate  finance" view, held by most 
academics  in the finance  area  and  many  Wall  Street practitioners,  holds 
that the 1986  act increased incentives for leverage because corporate 
rates were reduced by less  than top individual rates, and because 
increased  capital  gains taxes made equities less attractive  to individual 
investors. 
It is too early  to tell who is right.  My guess is that  the corporate  finance 
view is closer to being  right.  If so, we have an additional  explanation  for 
continuing  increases  in corporate  debt ratios. 
One could imagine  policies that  would clearly  reduce  the use of debt. 
For example, corporations  might  be allowed to deduct  only part  of their 
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ratios. But these policies would have substantial  collateral costs that 
might  outweigh  any benefits  in terms of financial  stability.  Most impor- 
tantly,  they would  substantially  raise  the cost of capital  facing  Amelrican 
firms,  thereby  discouraging  plant  and  equipment  investments  and  longer- 
term  projects  more  generally.  Analyses of the large  discrepancy  between 
the cost of capital  in the United States and  in Japan  typically  point  to the 
use of much higher  leverage in Japan  as a major  factor contributing  to 
their  low cost of capital.5  Further,  as I have argued  above, such policies 
might well reduce the degree of capital market  discipline imposed on 
managers.  Finally, they would create strong  incentives  to various  forms 
of merger activity directed at allowing firms to deduct more of their 
interest  payments. 
In summary,  huge federal deficits and rapidly  accumulating  foreign 
debt are truly serious economic problems.  It is extremely  unlikely  that 
corporate bankruptcies  would become macroeconomically  significant 
before a host of other problems  reached  enormous  proportions.  Given 
the limited  capacities  of the political  process, policymakers  should  focus 
on the serious problem  of the federal deficit rather  than fretting  about 
corporate  debt problems  that  are probably  not serious, and  in any event 
cannot be addressed  except through  policy measures that would have 
substantial  collateral  costs. 
General Discussion 
Some panelists concurred with Lawrence Summers that financial 
innovations  may allow the economy to support  safely a higher  stock of 
debt now than it has in the past. John Shoven agreed that  junk bonds 
may not have the same implications  for bankruptcy  as ordinary  bonds 
because, to the extent that  junk  bonds are closely held, bondholders  will 
be more likely to renegotiate  terms than to force bankruptcies.  If so, 
safe interest coverage ratios will be higher for junk bonds than for 
ordinary  debt. Robert Hall observed that the difference  between debt 
and equity can be less important  than their contractual  terms suggest. 
5. See, for example,  George  Hatsopoulos  and Steve Brooks, "The Cost of Capital  in 
the United  States  and  Japan:  An Update," paper  presented  at a conference  on the cost of 
capital  (John  F. Kennedy  School of Government,  Harvard  University,  November  19-24, 
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One reason is the characteristic  of junk bonds that Shoven described, 
which, in effect, provides firms  with bridge  loans from their creditors 
when  they are  needed. Another  is that  firms  under  pressure  from  outside 
directors  must continue to pay dividends  even when the firm  is having 
difficulties.  Hence, in Hall's view, equity is much like debt, except for 
its tax treatment.  James  Poterba  added  that  leveraged  buyouts  in recent 
years often involved "strip financing," whereby investors accepted 
different  classes of debt  as well as equity. So long  as the  original  investors 
continue to hold these various claims, their incentives are much the 
same as if they had  pure  equity  positions, but  with the tax advantages  of 
debt. Bruce  Greenwald  added  that  other, more  subtle, changes  may also 
have reduced  the risk  of bankruptcy.  For instance, labor  contracts,  like 
debt, can be a significant  fixed  commitment  of firms.  But in recent  years, 
workers have become more willing to accept flexible wage contracts, 
and  firms  have contracted  out more  work. 
Shoven reasoned that tax changes over the decade have favored 
increasing  debt. In the mid-1970s,  equity generally  had tax advantages 
over debt. An individual  in the top tax bracket received, after taxes, 
only 30 cents of a dollar  distributed  as interest  payments. On the other 
hand, 54 cents of a dollar  of retained  earnings  remained  after  paying  the 
corporate  income tax, of which at least 35 cents remained  after paying 
individual  capital  gains taxes. Thus, there was a 5 cent advantage  to an 
individual  in the top tax bracket to receiving a dollar of earnings as 
capital  gains rather  than interest  payments. Now that the corporate  tax 
rate is above the top individual  rate, Shoven noted, a dollar  of retained 
earnings  is taxed more heavily than a dollar  of interest  payments, even 
ignoring  the taxes on capital gains, giving debt a tax advantage over 
equity. However, Poterba pointed out that an increasing number of 
corporations  reported  tax  losses over  this  same  period  and  were  therefore 
unable  to use the corporate  interest  deductions,  making  equity  relatively 
more attractive  than debt for them. The tax effects on debt, he argued, 
cannot be determined  unless the tax status of individual  firms  is taken 
into account. 
Robert  Hall discussed the possible benefits of debt in the context of 
what he  called the  "back-to-the-wall" theory of finance, whereby 
financial  claims  are made  noncontingent  on the performance  of the firm. 
According  to this theory, such financing  creates the proper  incentives 
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the risk  of a financial  crisis. This moves the economy to higher  levels of 
debt, higher  mean  output,  and  higher  variance  of output.  But Hall  noted 
that he had not seen empirical  evidence supporting  this theory. Indeed, 
real output has grown relatively smoothly since the early 1980s, and 
evidence of efficiency gains in firms or industries that had leveraged 
themselves  is meager.  Greenwald  argued  that  back-to-the-wall  financing 
could have significant  effects that were external to the corporations 
themselves. To the extent that there are external  benefits  to stabilizing 
the activities of corporations,  such financing  is costly to society in that 
it adds to corporate  volatility. Furthermore,  activities such as research 
and development,  which have long payback  periods  as well as external- 
ities, might be sacrificed in a more volatile corporate environment, 
causing  a loss of overall  productivity  growth.  Benjamin  Friedman  added 
that the increase in debt financing  had not been associated with an 
increase  in corporate  investment. 
The question of whether a corporate debt crisis is worth worrying 
about provoked a general discussion. William Brainard  agreed with 
Summers's  observation  that  other  sectors are  more  endangered  than  the 
nonfinancial  corporations  the  authors  analyzed.  But  he took  little  comfort 
therein. If even major  corporations  are vulnerable  to plausible  macro- 
economic developments, the still greater  vulnerability  of other sectors 
is reason for concern, not complacence. Poterba  added that contagion 
effects might  spread  from bankruptcies  in some firms. He recalled  that 
when New York City was on the brink  of bankruptcy,  borrowing  costs 
rose for other states and municipalities. 
In response  to Friedman's  contention  that  the Federal  Reserve would 
prevent a crisis by easing monetary  policy, Ben Bernanke  questioned 
whether  such an  expansionary  policy would  work  fast enough  to prevent 
a collapse. James Tobin was skeptical  that the Federal Reserve would 
respond to liquidity  problems  of nonfinancial  corporations,  as distinct 
from financial  institutions.  Summers  argued  that an inflationary  bias in 
monetary  policy would not solve the bankruptcy  problem, but would, 
over time, increase  the use of debt and thus exacerbate  it. 
Friedman  criticized  the authors'  cross-sectional  regressions  explain- 
ing debt-asset ratios as a function of the market's  valuation  of equity. 
He reasoned that coiporate reorganizations  and takeovers may have 
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Several  individuals  suggested  improvements  in  the  authors'  treatment 
of bankruptcy  risk.  Brainard  suggested  that  a  fuller  analysis  of the market 
value of the firm relative to the value of its debt obligation required 
estimating  that ratio over a distribution  of future earnings relative to 
contractual payments. He also supported the authors' attention to 
liquidity  constraints, observing that because financial  markets  are far 
from  perfect  predictors,  bankruptcy  could occur because of an inability 
to meet current  obligations  even if the firm  appeared  viable in the long 
run. Alan Blinder  argued  that real interest rates are more appropriate 
than  nominal  rates  for comparing  interest  bur  dens because they account 
for the evaporation  of principal  due to inflation. However, Friedman 
defended  the use of nominal  rates, noting  that cash flow obligations  are 
nominal.  Although  inflation  would  reduce  their  value over time, it would 
not help avoid a liquidity  crisis that might  emerge in the short term. In 
this connection, Summers  observed  that  coverage calculations  ought  to 
take into account  the obligations  to repay  principal  as well as interest. 